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ANCILLARY ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION:
THE MISINTERPRETATION OF KOKKONEN AND
EXPUNGEMENT PETITIONS
ABSTRACT
Criminal records do not always provide the disposition of the case.
Therefore, in some circumstances, individuals who were arrested and
subsequently had their charges dismissed or who were acquitted at trial are not
always distinguishable from those convicted of a crime. For those individuals
who were convicted of a crime, criminal records additionally do not always
provide information on the crime you were convicted of. Consequently, the
proliferation in access to background checks has resulted in the stigma
associated with an arrest record becoming a significant barrier to employment
and housing opportunities for individuals with a record.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America, nearly every federal circuit had held that district
courts had ancillary jurisdiction to entertain motions to expunge criminal
records solely under equitable considerations. District courts, in deciding these
petitions, would balance the interests of the individuals in having their records
expunged against the interests of the public in having the records widely
available. Because of the great strength of the public interest in the availability
of these records, a court would only grant these petitions in extraordinary
circumstances.
The Court in Kokkonen attempted to clarify the scope of the murky and illdefined ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. The Court set forth two circumstances in
which ancillary jurisdiction had generally been asserted: “(1) to permit
disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,
factually interdependent . . . and (2) to enable a court to function successfully,
that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees . . . .” After this decision was cast down, there has been a domino effect
of federal circuits holding they no longer have the authority to assert ancillary
jurisdiction over equitable expungement motions reasoning that they do not fall
within the reach of the test Kokkonen articulates.
Unfortunately for individuals with criminal records, these circuit courts
interpret the Court’s decision in Kokkonen far too narrowly. Accordingly, this
Comment argues that neither the language of the holding in Kokkonen nor the
holding itself warrant the restrictive interpretation that these circuits apply.

SALKY_8.28.20

1256

8/28/2020 1:28 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1255

These lower courts are disregarding the qualifying language the Court
employed and the cues the Court gave that demonstrate its intent was not to set
a strict standard for ancillary jurisdiction.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1257
I. ISSUES EQUITABLE EXPUNGEMENT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO
REMEDY ........................................................................................... 1260
A. Employment Issues ................................................................. 1260
B. Housing Issues ........................................................................ 1262
C. Increase in Recidivism ............................................................ 1263
II. SOURCES OF THE COURTS’ JURISDICTION TO EXPUNGE RECORDS .. 1264
A. Equitable Powers .................................................................... 1265
1. A Court Should Only Expunge Criminal Records in
Extreme Circumstances .................................................... 1266
B. Expungement Statutes ............................................................. 1268
1. Federal Statutes ................................................................ 1268
2. State Statutes .................................................................... 1269
C. Violations of the Constitution ................................................. 1271
1. Federal Courts ................................................................. 1271
2. State Courts ...................................................................... 1272
III. OVERVIEW OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AND THE KOKKONEN
DECISION ......................................................................................... 1274
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction ............................................................. 1274
B. Traditional Exercises of Ancillary Jurisdiction ...................... 1276
C. The Kokkonen Decision .......................................................... 1279
D. The Two Prongs of Kokkonen ................................................ 1282
IV. EQUITABLE EXPUNGEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER KOKKONEN ......... 1289
A. Equitable Expungement Prior to Kokkonen ........................... 1289
B. Equitable Expungement After Kokkonen ............................... 1292
V. THE CONSTRAINING MISINTERPRETATION OF KOKKONEN .............. 1297
A. The Misinterpretation ............................................................. 1298
B. The Area Between the Prongs: Kokkonen (1.5) ..................... 1301
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 1304

SALKY_8.28.20

2020]

8/28/2020 1:28 PM

ANCILLARY ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION

1257

“The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative
value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct.”
—Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957)
INTRODUCTION
The United States has a glaring need for an equitable mechanism to enable
a federal court to expunge criminal records. This need is exemplified by the fact
that out of the roughly 327 million people living in the United States today,1
more than 100 million have arrest records.2 To put that into perspective: If the
100 million people in the United States with arrest records formed their own
country, that new country would rank in the top twenty countries by world
population.3 Even more startling, researchers have estimated that by the age of
twenty-three, nearly one-third of Americans4 and roughly 50% of AfricanAmerican males will have been arrested.5
If an individual is arrested, that individual has a criminal record.6 However,
the fact that an individual has a record is not indicative of whether that individual
committed any criminal act.7 Accordingly, criminal records are misleading,
which stems from the fact that they do not always distinguish between
individuals who have had their charges dismissed, are acquitted at trial, or are
convicted of a crime.8
This lack of delineation about the ultimate outcome of a case is displayed in
a study conducted by the National Employment Law Project.9 The study found

1

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF
FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL
ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 1 (2016).
3
Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal Records as College Diplomas,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/just-facts-many-americans-havecriminal-records-college-diplomas.
4
Mark Memmott, More Than 30 Percent of Americans Are Arrested by Age 23, Study Says, NPR (Dec.
11, 2011, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2011/12/19/143947345/more-than-30-percentof-americans-arrested-by-age-23-study-says.
5
Study: Nearly Half of Black Men Arrested by Age 23, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2014/01/20/nearly-half-arrested/4669225/ (last updated Jan. 20, 2014, 5:23 PM).
6
Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, Have You Ever Been Arrested? Check Here, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/opinion/have-you-ever-been-arrested-check-here.html.
7
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957); United States v. Zapete-Garcia, 447 F.3d
57, 60 (1st Cir. 2006).
8
See MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WANTED, ACCURATE
FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT, REWARD: GOOD JOBS 3 (2013).
9
Id.
2
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that 50% of FBI records do not include the final disposition of the case.10
Additionally, the study discovered that “a majority of the U.S. population live
in states where more than 30 percent of the arrest records . . . do not include . . .
the final outcome of the case.”11 Thus, the stigma associated with a record,
regardless of conviction, and what the conviction was for, can pose substantial
problems for an arrestee in today’s society. Loretta Lynch, while Attorney
General of the United States, observed that in the current state of society in the
United States, the stigma associated with a criminal record places an individual
at a sometimes-insurmountable disadvantage:
Too often, Americans who have paid their debt to society leave prison
only to find that they continue to be punished for past mistakes. They
might discover that they are ineligible for student loans, putting an
education out of reach. They might struggle to get a driver’s license,
making employment difficult to find and sustain. Landlords might
deny them housing because of their criminal records—an
unfortunately common practice. They might even find that they are not
allowed to vote based on misguided state laws that prevent returning
citizens from taking part in civic life.12

This stigma has extreme negative consequences in employment and housing
opportunities, as well as increases the chances of recidivism.13 Accordingly,
these consequences act as a catalyst for a self-feeding cycle that is arduous for a
person with a criminal record to detach themselves from.
The cycle begins with an arrest. Afterwards, a person either has her charges
dismissed, pleads guilty, or is convicted or acquitted at trial.14 Regardless of the
outcome of the case, that person now has a record15 which plays a stifling role
in her ability to gain employment.16 This record, coupled with the struggle to
find employment, further contributes to a lack of housing opportunities.17
Altogether, the difficulty of finding adequate employment and stable housing

10
11
12

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at National Reentry Week Event in Philadelphia (Apr. 25,

2016).
13
See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 585–88 (D. Md. 2014); Zainab Wurie, Tainted:
The Need for Equity Based Federal Expungement, 6 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 31, 35–38
(2012); Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV.
403, 404–08 (2015).
14
Stages of a Criminal Case, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/stages-of-a-criminal-case/
(last updated Apr. 2018).
15
Rosenberg, supra note 6.
16
See infra notes 24–33 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 36–48 and accompanying text.
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has a strong correlation to increased recidivism rates.18 Thus, the cycle starts
over again, with an arrest.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America,19 a district court had the authority, through the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, to save an individual from this vicious cycle
solely under equitable considerations.20 A court could exercise its ancillary
jurisdiction in response to an individual’s petition to have their record
expunged.21 However, after the Court decided Kokkonen, circuit courts, starting
with the Ninth Circuit, began holding one by one that the Court’s decision
precluded district courts from exercising ancillary jurisdiction to hear
expungement petitions that raise solely equitable considerations.22 This
Comment argues that this interpretation of Kokkonen is far narrower than the
language of Kokkonen suggests and further asserts that a district court’s
jurisdiction to expunge criminal records under solely equitable considerations is
not precluded by the Supreme Court’s holding.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the employment and housing
issues presented to individuals with criminal records as well as discusses how
those issues lead into increased recidivism rates. Part II summarizes the three
potential sources of authority for a court to hear expungement petitions and sets
forth the different federal and state approaches to each source of authority. Part
III examines the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine that survived the passage of the
supplemental jurisdiction statue and analyzes the intricacies of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kokkonen. Part IV sets forth the circuits’ approaches to
equitable expungement before and after Kokkonen. Lastly, Part V explains that
the circuit courts are interpreting Kokkonen far too narrowly, describes the
proper interpretation of Kokkonen, and illuminates how the expunging of
criminal records solely under equitable considerations falls under the correct
interpretation of Kokkonen.

18

See infra notes 53–58.
511 U.S. 375 (1994).
20
E.g., United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 817 (10th Cir. 1988); Allen v. Webster, 742 F.2d 153,
154–55 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977).
21
E.g., Friesen, 853 F.2d at 817; Allen, 742 F.2d at 154–55; Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539.
22
E.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d
47, 50–52 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2000).
19
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ISSUES EQUITABLE EXPUNGEMENT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO REMEDY

The stigma that attaches to an individual with a criminal record places that
individual at a significant disadvantage in various aspects of today’s society.
This effect is exacerbated by the increase in accessibility of background
checks.23 Therefore, today, more than ever before, there is a need for the ability
to petition to get one’s criminal record expunged. This Part first addresses the
employment issues an individual with a criminal record faces. Second, this Part
examines these individuals’ difficulties in finding housing and observes how the
government is not necessarily alleviating this problem. Lastly, this Part
recognizes how the hurdles in gaining employment and finding housing act as a
springboard for increased recidivism rates.
A. Employment Issues
The stigma attached to a criminal record presents a significant barrier to
employment.24 This barrier is further fortified with the proliferation of
background checks.25 The rise in background checks and an employer’s access
to them has been spurred by advances in technology.26 According to a survey
primarily of large employers, 92% of the employers stated that they conduct a
background check on some, if not all, of their job candidates.27 Furthermore,
63% of the employers in the study, despite knowing that a candidate was not
convicted, stated that the arrest of a prospective candidate would still play at
least a minimal role in deciding whether to extend an offer to that candidate.28
Additionally, a survey conducted in major cities, regarding individuals that were

23
See Valerie Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline: Criminal Record Checks, Race, and
Disparate Impact, 93 IND. L.J. 421, 428 (2018) (noting that “an entire industry has arisen to respond to the
demand” for electronic criminal records). See generally United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 585–88
(D. Md. 2014); Wurie, supra note 13, at 35; Kessler, supra note 13, at 441; Background Checking: Conducting
Criminal Background Checks, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.slideshare.net/
shrm/background-check-criminal?from=share_email.
24
See generally McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 585–88; Wurie, supra note 13, at 33; Kessler, supra note
13, at 404–08.
25
Supra note 23.
26
Kimani Paul-Emile, Reconsidering Criminal Background Checks: Race, Gender, and Redemption, 25
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 395, 401 (2016).
27
Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Background Checks, supra note 23.
28
Id. An arrest record may not be the only reason for denying a prospective candidate. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012). However,
this restriction is limited because an “employer may make an employment decision based on the conduct
underlying an arrest. . . .” Id.
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convicted of a crime, found that 65% of employers “would not knowingly hire
an ex-convict.”29
With that being said, there are federal and state regulations that attempt to
tear down some of the barriers ex-convicts face in obtaining employment.30
These regulations provide tax incentives to businesses that hire ex-convicts.31
For example, to stimulate the hiring of ex-felons, the Internal Revenue Service
gives a federal tax credit to employers that hire an ex-felon within a year of being
convicted or released from prison.32 Unfortunately, the harsh reality is that the
consequences of increase in access to background checks are that individuals
with criminal records often resort to taking less desirable, lower-paying jobs or
no job at all, which feeds into a lack of housing opportunities and ultimately
increased rates of recidivism.33
Although the proliferation in access to criminal background checks does
have negative impact on individuals with records in the employment context, a
lack of access to criminal records may likewise have a detrimental effect on
employers. Stemming from the common law, an employer has a duty to protect
her patrons and bystanders from reasonably foreseeable harm caused by her
employees.34 Accordingly, an employer could potentially open herself up to
substantial liability if she is not vigilant in her hiring practices.35 Thus, the
interests of an employer and an individual with a record can be at odds with each
other. A key to resolving these dueling interests is striking the balance between
denying job applicants who pose a risk in a particular occupation and accepting
the individuals that pose no risk and would excel in that role given the
opportunity.

29
Joseph C. Dugan, Note, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement Law, 90 IND.
L.J. 1321, 1323 (2015).
30
See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/216 (2018) (tax credit for wages paid to ex-offenders); IOWA ADMIN.
CODE r. 701-40.21 (2019) (tax credit for small businesses that hire ex-felons); Work Opportunity Tax Credit,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/work-opportunitytax-credit (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (providing federal tax incentives to businesses that hire ex-felons within a
year their conviction or release from prison).
31
See, e.g., supra note 30.
32
Work Opportunity Tax Credit, supra note 30.
33
See Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Federal
Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 162–63 (2010); see also Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in
the Information Age, 2015 WISC. L. REV. 321, 333 (noting studies that illustrate that individuals who are able to
obtain employment have lower rates of recidivism).
34
See Terence G. Connor & Kevin J. White, The Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in
Employment Decisions: A Critique of the EEOC Guidance, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 974 (2013).
35
See id. at 972–73.
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B. Housing Issues
A person with a criminal record who is struggling to find employment is also
presented with the issue of finding housing. Although an arrest record without a
conviction alone is insufficient grounds for a private property owner to reject a
housing application,36 that does not preclude discrimination on the basis of arrest
records.37 This serves as a restriction on private property owners from having a
broad policy of denying any applicant with a criminal record but does not
prohibit landowners from considering arrest records.38 The consideration of
records, coupled with the multitude of other factors, such as income, credit, and
job history, afford landlords wide discretion in contemplating housing
applications.39 Taking this into account, scholars have observed that, in practice,
“the mere existence of [a] criminal record serves as a bar to obtaining suitable
housing.”40
For individuals who have been convicted of a crime, as opposed to those
merely arrested, certain federal policies present a much larger problem for their
search for housing. Under the Fair Housing Act, a private property owner may
refuse a housing application because of the applicant’s prior criminal
conviction.41 Hence, an ex-convict’s best chance at having a roof over her head
may be through public housing.42 However, the guidelines for the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provide that a Public Housing
Agency (PHA) has the discretion to rely on arrest records in determining
whether to accept or deny a person’s application.43
Further, HUD has adopted a “one strike policy” for certain criminal acts.44
Under this policy, if a member of a household commits one of the enumerated
36

U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 2, at 5.
See Schneider, supra note 23; see also Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal
Records Denied Access to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 546 (2005).
38
Camila Domonoske, Denying Housing over Criminal Record May Be Discrimination, Feds Say, NPR
(Apr. 4, 2016, 1:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/04/472878724/denying-housingover-criminal-record-may-be-discrimination-feds-say.
39
See generally Four Reasons Why a Landlord Can (and Can’t) Reject a Rental Application, LAW
DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/article/four-reason-landlord-can-cant-reject-rental-application/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2020).
40
Schneider, supra note 23, at 424.
41
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 2, at 6. However, the property owner must have a
nondiscriminatory and substantial interest in rejecting the housing application. Id.
42
Carey, supra note 38, at 552.
43
Id. at 566.
44
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2012); Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedure, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4
(l)(5)(i)–(iv) (2017). See generally Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2000)
(drug-related activity); Lowell Hous. Auth. v. Melendez, 865 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Mass. 2007) (“violent crimes”);
37
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criminal acts or a criminal act that “threatens the health, safety or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the other residents,” she is to be evicted.45 What exactly
falls under the “threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of
other residents” is largely up to the discretion of the PHA.46 Hence, the breadth
of these policies has had the detrimental effect of “increasing rates of recidivism,
and harming public safety.”47
Similar to the responsibility employers have to protect their patrons from
foreseeable harm, landlords may be liable for the acts of their tenants and
therefore also have a robust interest in widespread access to criminal background
checks.48 Landlords have been found liable for the actions of their tenants in an
array of circumstances. Such circumstances include, inter alia, when a tenant
commits a criminal act and the landlord should have known that the tenant was
dangerous49 and when a tenant’s action or inaction results in a nuisance.50
Furthermore, if a landlord’s property is associated with illegal drugs, regardless
of whether the landlord actually knew the drugs were present, the landlord’s
property may be subject to a civil forfeiture action.51 Thus, analogous to the
dueling interests of an employer and potential employee with a record, a balance
needs to be struck between the clashing interests of a landlord and a prospective
tenant.
C. Increase in Recidivism
The struggles to gain employment and find housing feeds into increased rates
of recidivism for individuals with a criminal record.52 These individuals are

Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Miller, 935 A.2d 1197, 1998 (N,J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (“disorderly
persons offense”).
45
24 C.F.R. § 996.4(f)(12)(i)(A)(1); see Burton, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (noting that, under the
regulation, a lessee is obligated to ensure that a person under their control does not act in a way that “threatens
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment” of other residents). A PHA is financed by the federal
government and runs and operates its local housing programs. HUD’s Public Housing Program, DEP’T HOUSING
& URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).
46
Mackenzie J. Yee, Note, Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an Extraordinary Harm,
25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 169, 173 (2017).
47
Schneider, supra note 23, at 431–32; see also Carey, supra note 38, at 566 (arguing that
“[h]omelessness itself is a predictor for recidivism”).
48
See Rebecca Oyama, Do Not (Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal Background Tenant Screening as a
Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 190–91 (2009).
49
B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability on
Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 711 (1992).
50
Id. at 724.
51
Id. at 740–41.
52
See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 586–87 (D. Md. 2014); see also Carey, supra note
38, at 566 (noting that “[h]omelessness itself is a predictor for recidivism”).
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more likely to commit crimes of survival such as burglary and theft to acquire
money to support themselves.53 A study conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Prisons found that ex-offenders that were able to obtain post-release
employment had a recidivism rate of 27.6 percent “compared to 53.9 percent”
for those that did not obtain post-release employment.54 Moreover, a survey
conducted in New York of individuals released from prison determined that an
ex-offender that is unable to find suitable housing is seven times more likely to
recidivate than an ex-offender that does find housing.55
The increased recidivism, however, counteracts one of the chief goals of the
criminal justice system. As the Supreme Court stated in Kelly v. Robinson, “[t]he
criminal justice system is not operated primarily for the benefit of victims, but
for the benefit of society as a whole. . . . [I]t is concerned not only with punishing
the offender, but also rehabilitating him.”56 The clash between the goal of
rehabilitation and the ultimate recidivism of a substantial portion of individuals
with criminal records presents society with a catch-22—the public benefit of
having criminal records liberally and widely available to the public57 directly
conflicts with the harm to the public as a consequence of substantial rates of
recidivism.
II. SOURCES OF THE COURTS’ JURISDICTION TO EXPUNGE RECORDS
There are three potential sources of jurisdiction for a federal court to
expunge criminal records: (1) the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction to expunge
criminal records on equitable grounds; (2) legislation passed by Congress
granting the federal court jurisdiction; and (3) a cause of action brought in court
by an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated.58 Currently, a
majority of federal circuits hold that courts do not have ancillary jurisdiction to
expunge criminal records on equitable grounds.59 This Comment argues that
53

See Schneider, supra note 23, at 432–33.
MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS OFFICE OF RESEARCH & EVALUATION, RECIDIVISM
AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987, at 4–5 (1994).
55
Schneider, supra note 23, at 432–33.
56
479 U.S. 36, 52 (1986).
57
Infra note 73 and accompanying text.
58
See United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]n the absence of any applicable
statute enacted by Congress, or an allegation that the criminal proceedings were invalid or illegal, a District
Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record . . . .”); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d
536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (“No federal statute provide[d] for the expungement of an arrest record. Instead,
expungement lies within the equitable discretion of the court . . . .”).
59
See, e.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 298 (2017) (noting the trend of federal circuits holding
that they do not retain ancillary jurisdiction after Kokkonen). But see United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d
577, 582–83 (D. Md. 2014) (holding the court had jurisdiction under the second circumstance in Kokkonen);
54
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federal courts do, under Supreme Court jurisprudence, have the discretion to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction to expunge criminal records based on solely
equitable considerations. This Part will first provide a background on a federal
court’s equitable powers. Second, this Part will examine the different
expungement statutes at the federal and state levels. Lastly, this Part will review
federal and state court approaches to expunging records when there is a
constitutional violation.
A. Equitable Powers
A federal court’s equitable powers stem from the “principles of the system
of judicial remedies” of the English Court of Chancery.60 The Court of Chancery
was only allowed to exercise its equitable powers when there was not an
adequate common law remedy for a claimant.61 This equitable power for federal
courts in the United States is embedded in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.62 Article III, Section 2 grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases
or controversies in “law and equity.”63 Similar to the Court of Chancery in
England, a federal court in the United States is only allowed to hear a case in
equity when no “adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.”64
Because a court may exercise equity jurisdiction when there are no adequate
remedies at law, a court may only sit in equity in limited circumstances. In other
words, as Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[t]he great and primary use of a court of
equity is to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to the general
rules.”65 Today, like the English chancery court, a federal court exercises its
equity jurisdiction only in exceptional cases.66 Examples of these scenarios
include where a claimant, inter alia, seeks to enjoin or force another party to act
in a specified manner by way of injunction or specific performance or attempts

United States v. Allen, 57 F. Supp. 3d 533, 541 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (same).
60
Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939).
61
Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 218, 229 (2018). Historically, the Court
of Chancery found there to be no adequate remedies at law when a party brought an action for “fraud, accident,
or mistake” as well as other areas where the common law was insufficient. David W. Raack, A History of
Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J. 539, 555 (1986).
62
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
63
Id.
64
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82. The Judiciary Act further provided that cases of
equity were not subject to a trial by jury. Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 80.
65
Morley, supra note 62, at 231 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (George
W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001)).
66
Jurisdiction: Equity, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdiction-equity (last
visited Feb. 26, 2020).
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to gain title to real property against all other potential claimants through quiet
title.67
In addition to the strict requirement that a claimant must exhaust all remedies
at law before a court can administer an equitable remedy, courts will generally
only administer an equitable remedy in particularized circumstances.68 Such
circumstances are imperative because the remedies tend to significantly
implicate the rights of others.69 For example, a plaintiff seeking a permanent
injunction enjoining a person or entity permanently from doing some act must
satisfy a stringent four-factor test.70 Under the four-factor test, the plaintiff must
show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.71

Coupling the stringent inquiries, like that for an injunction, with the preliminary
requirement of there being no adequate remedy at law, denotes that the chances
of a litigant succeeding in an equitable action are often low.
1. A Court Should Only Expunge Criminal Records in Extreme
Circumstances
Historically, like any equitable remedy, the expunction of criminal records
was only granted in limited circumstances.72 As one court noted, “expungement
is, in fact, an extraordinary remedy and that ‘unwarranted adverse consequences’
must be uniquely significant to outweigh the strong public interest in
67
See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 541–42 (2016) (“The
equitable remedies still used regularly in the United States are the injunction, specific performance . . . and a
cluster of restitutionary remedies: accounting for profits . . . and equitable recession.”).
68
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting the four-factor test applied
in injunction actions); Ellis v. Dixie Highway Special Rd. & Bridge Dist., 138 So. 374, 375 (Fla. 1931) (“[A]
court of equity will give relief in respect of personality and quiet title thereto when, owing to exceptional
circumstances, there is no adequate remedy at law.”).
69
See generally eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (injunction); King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. 311, 328 (1830)
(specific performance of a contract); Ellis, 138 So. at 375–76 (quiet title).
70
See, e.g., eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (noting that this test was “[a]ccording to well-established principles
of equity”).
71
Id.
72
See, e.g., United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating, absent a federal statute,
a court may expunge records in “extreme circumstances” based on equitable considerations).
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maintaining accurate and undoctored records.”73 Despite the issues that criminal
records may present,74 public policy considerations warrant this stringent
inquiry for a variety of reasons.75 First, the public has a “common law right of
access to judicial records.”76 Additionally, the public has a strong interest in
knowing the potential risks their neighbors may present.77 Similarly, individuals
engaging in business or in search of a licensed professional have a significant
interest in being fully informed of the character of the person they are interacting
with.78
The expungement of criminal records further presents problems for
employers and law enforcement.79 The problems presented to employers
originate from their responsibility for their employee’s actions and their duty to
hire employees that do not present a threat to others.80 Regarding law
enforcement practices, the information that accompanies criminal records is also
instrumental to investigations.81 Information about a prior act may aid in
identifying a potential criminal by providing insight on the modus operandi of
the offender and the fingerprint and DNA data imbedded in the record may play
a crucial role in identification.82
Expunging criminal records also poses an issue for the judicial system.83 A
criminal record can only be effectively expunged if the person whose record was
expunged is allowed to deny that she has been arrested, no matter the occasion.84
An issue arises, then, when an individual whose record has been expunged is
called to testify at a public trial, as a character witness for example, and is asked
if she has ever been arrested.85 Forcing the individual to answer affirmatively
defeats the purpose of expunging the criminal record in the first place.86
However, if the individual is allowed to answer in the negative, it is essentially
73
74
75

United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004).
See supra Part I.
See Dugan, supra note 29, at 1329–30; Yee, supra note 47, at 178–79; Kessler, supra note 13, at 414–

15.
76

Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
See Dugan, supra note 29, at 1329–30; Yee, supra note 47, at 178–79.
78
See James W. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a Definition, 66 ST. JOHNS L. REV.
73, 76–77 (1992); Dugan, supra note 29, at 1329–30; Yee, supra note 47, at 178–79.
79
See Diehm, supra note 79, at 77; Kessler, supra note 13, at 414.
80
See Kessler, supra note 13, at 414.
81
Diehm, supra note 79, at 77.
82
Id.; see also DNA Sample Collection from Arrestees, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.nij.
gov/topics/forensics/evidence/dna/pages/collection-from-arrestees.aspx.
83
See Diehm, supra note 79, at 76.
84
See id.
85
See id.
86
See id.
77
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court-sponsored perjury.87 This grey area accompanying the expunging of
criminal records has the potential to be extremely difficult for a judge to navigate
through. In balancing the public interest and the interest of the person with the
record, this ambiguity favors the public interest and cuts against the arguments
for expunging criminal records.
B. Expungement Statutes
Another basis on which a court may derive the power to expunge criminal
records is an express legislative grant.88 However, currently no general
expungement statutes exist at the federal or state level allowing a court to
expunge records on the basis of fundamental fairness.89 In light of the
encumbering consequences faced by individuals with criminal records, there has
been a substantial amount of scholarship pressuring Congress and state
legislatures to pass a general expungement statute.90 Much of this scholarship
maintains that Congress and state legislatures are better-equipped than the courts
to provide for the expungement of criminal records.91
This Section will first discuss the few federal statutes that grant federal
courts the power to expunge criminal records. Second, this Section will expound
upon the variety of approaches to expungement taken by state legislatures as
well as examine the different views adopted by state courts on their authority to
expunge records.
1. Federal Statutes
Although Congress has not passed a general expungement statute, it has
passed a few statutes that grant courts the power to expunge records in specific
circumstances.92 The three premier statutes that provide for the expunging of
records concern (1) DNA records of a person after their military conviction is

87
See id. But see Kessler, supra note 13, at 446 (“Expungement law is not an effort to rewrite history, but
‘reflects the fact that past convictions followed by a lengthy period of law-abiding conduct simply are not
relevant in predicting future criminal activity or assessing credibility.’”).
88
See, e.g., Diehm, supra note 79, at 80.
89
Id.; Kessler, supra note 13, at 427–29.
90
See generally Diehm, supra note 78, at 102–06 (arguing that a federal statute on expungement “will
eliminate many of the uncertainties that now exist” on the issue of whether federal courts have the to expunge
criminal records); Yee, supra note 47, at 188 (asserting there should be a “comprehensive statute”); Kessler,
supra note 13, at 428–29 (urging state legislatures to pass expungement statutes).
91
See Diehm, supra note 79, at 102–06; see also Kessler, supra note 13, at 431–33.
92
13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3523.2 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE].
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overturned;93 (2) certain FBI DNA records of a person after her conviction is
overturned;94 and (3) records of persons under the age of twenty-one convicted
under Section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act.95
These statutes suggest that Congress engaged in a balancing of public policy
interests with fundamental fairness to the individuals with records.96 Although
Congress is not currently entertaining the idea of a general expungement
statute,97 these three statutes do provide Congress with a potential framework to
pass a more comprehensive statute in the future. The Second Circuit noted these
statutes and conspicuously hinted to Congress that it might want to consider a
more comprehensive approach:98 “[T]hat the District Court had no authority to
expunge records of a valid conviction in this case says nothing about Congress’s
ability to provide jurisdiction in similar cases . . . . Congress has done so in other
contexts. It might consider doing so again . . . .”99
2. State Statutes
While Congress has not addressed the expunging of criminal records outside
of the limited circumstances stated above, state expungement provisions vary
greatly.100 For crimes other than misdemeanors and petty offenses,101 some
states, much like Congress, provide little to no opportunity for the expungement
of records.102 Conversely, other state legislatures, such as Alabama and
Maryland, have passed statutes that contain provisions for the automatic
expungement of arrest records for certain felonies, where the charges were
dropped, dismissed, or the person was acquitted.103 Moreover, several state
legislatures have enacted statutes that allow for the expungement of convictions
for a variety of crimes and some further permit expungement after the
93

10 U.S.C. § 1565(e) (2012).
34 U.S.C. §12592(d) (2012).
95
18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (2012).
96
See supra notes 73–88 and accompanying text.
97
There is one bill currently in the House Judiciary Committee that, if passed, would grant a federal court
the authority to expunge criminal records for non-violent offenders under certain conditions. Expungement Act
of 2017, H.R. 3578, 115th Cong. (2017).
98
Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
99
Id.
100
See generally 50-State Comparison: Judicial Expungement, Sealing, and Set-Aside, RESTORATION
RTS. PROJECT (Dec. 2019), http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicialexpungement-sealing-and-set-aside/.
101
Wurie, supra note 13, at 41 (noting at the state and local level, “misdemeanors and petty offenses are
relatively easy to get expunged”).
102
Kessler, supra note 13, at 417–18. For a comprehensive list of the different approaches states take, see
50-State Comparison, supra note 101.
103
Kessler, supra note 13, at 417–18, 418 n.123 (discussing Alabama and Maryland statutes).
94
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completion of rehabilitation programs.104 Although state legislatures do
generally provide more guidance than Congress, there still is a significant lack
of statutory authority in the area of expungement that is begging to be filled.105
This void leaves the opportunity for state courts to fill it. However, just as
state statutes vary greatly, state courts, absent statutory authorization, also vary
regarding their power to expunge criminal records.106 A number of state courts
have held they do not have the authority to expunge records without express
authorization from a state legislature, because doing so would violate separation
of powers.107 Nevertheless, the state courts that agree that expunging records
would raise a separation of powers issue disagree over which branch is being
encroached upon.108
Other courts take a different view. A handful of courts assert, absent
statutory authority, that they have the inherent power to expunge criminal
records.109 In Pennsylvania, for example, the supreme court asserted this
inherent power and explained that “there is a long-standing right,” rooted in due
process, to petition the court to exercise its discretion to expunge a criminal
record.110 Nonetheless, in the spirit of ambiguity and a lack of conformity, some
courts have refused to fully address the issue.111

104

See 50-State Comparison, supra note 101.
See generally id.
106
Kessler, supra note 13, at 417–18.
107
See Commonwealth v. Jones, 406 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Ky. 2013); Stanton v. State, 686 P.2d 587, 589
(Wyo. 1984). Federal courts, however, have not traditionally viewed separation of powers as a barrier to
expunging records. Diehm, supra note 79, at 80. But see United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871, 877 (6th Cir.
2010) (“[O]ne person’s equitable power is another person’s authority to remake federal law and to cross serious
separation-of-power divides in the process.”).
108
See, e.g., Jones, 406 S.W.3d at 861 (holding that where a statute does not provide for expungement, it
would encroach upon legislative power for a court to expunge criminal records); Stanton, 686 P.2d at 589
(holding a court cannot expunge criminal records without statutory authority because doing so would encroach
upon the pardon power of the governor).
109
See Mulkey v. Purdy, 234 So. 2d 108, 111 (Fla. 1970) (holding a court may retain jurisdiction to
expunge records in cases of “overriding equitable considerations”); Commonwealth v. Moto, 23 A.3d 989, 991
(Pa. 2011) (noting the trial court’s discretion to expunge arrest records); In re A.N.T., 798 S.E.2d 623, 626 (W.
Va. 2017) (maintaining there are two potential bases of authority for expunging records: (1) statutory grant and
(2) the courts inherent power).
110
Moto, 23 A.3d at 993.
111
See Farmer v. State, 235 P.3d 1012, 1014–15 (Alaska 2010). In Farmer, the court noted that on a
previous occasion the court dodged resolving the issue of whether a trial court has inherent authority to expunge
records. Id. at 1014. Likewise, here the court refused to resolve the issue and held “even if Alaska courts do have
inherent authority to expunge . . . this case does not present circumstances that would justify expungement.” Id.
105
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C. Violations of the Constitution
The Constitution is the third and final potential authority for a court to
expunge criminal records. Courts appear have the authority to expunge criminal
records to remedy an arrest or conviction that was in violation of the
Constitution.112 Constitutional violations are the one area where both federal and
state courts agree that their authority to expunge records is substantiated.113 This
is not to be conflated or confused with the argument that there is a constitutional
right to expungement.114 This Section will first discuss the approach used in
federal courts and then discuss the approach used in state courts.
1. Federal Courts
In the federal system, there is a semblance of a general agreement that a court
retains the authority to expunge arrest records if the arrest or conviction violated
the Constitution or a federal statute.115 There is an expansive amount of case law
where courts have refused to expunge records because the petitioner did not
allege that the arrest or conviction was illegal.116 However, there is a paucity of
case law illustrating situations where courts have, in fact, granted a petition for
the expungement of criminal records on the basis of a constitutional violation.
Nevertheless, courts repeatedly appear to reserve this power on bases such as
“the defendant filed a motion in the original criminal case seeking expungement

112

Infra note 117 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Field, 756 F.3d
911, 915–16 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 49 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 861–62 (8th Cir. 2006); Farmer, 250 P.3d at 1015; State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 274
(Minn. 2008); In re A.N.T., 798 S.E.2d at 626–28.
114
See Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1997) (“There is no constitutional
basis for a ‘right to expungement.’”); United States v. Johnson, 714 F. Supp. 522, 523 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (“[T]he
right to the expungement of a criminal record is not a federal constitutional right.”).
115
See Field, 756 F.3d at 915–16; Coloian, 480 F.3d at 49 n.4; Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861–62.
116
See Wahi, 850 F.3d at 303 (“Expungement authority must . . . have a source in the Constitution or
statutes.”); Field, 756 F.3d at 915–16 (assuming that a federal court has the authority to expunge criminal records
when there was a violation of the constitution); Coloian, 480 F.3d at 49 n.4 (denying the petitioner’s
expungement application because he did not seek expungement under a federal statute nor for a violation of the
Constitution); United States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that a court has the
inherent authority to expunge records to preserve “basic legal rights” (quoting United States v. McMains, 540
F.2d 387, 389–90 (8th Cir. 1976))); Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861–62 (refusing to assert jurisdiction over the
petitioner’s expungement application because he did not allege there was a violation of a federal statute or the
Constitution); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court’s ancillary
jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a clerical
error.”). But see Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1084–85 (5th Cir. 1972) (reversing the district courts
expunction of the defendant’s records where the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel).
113
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of his record[] . . . but did not allege any unlawful arrest or other legal
infirmity.”117
The courts that have expunged arrest records for illegal arrests or convictions
have done so in a narrow set of egregious circumstances.118 One court ordered
the expungement of arrest records of innocent individuals swept up in a mass
arrest, without a proper showing of probable cause, during a protest about the
U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia.119 Another court ordered expungement
of the arrest and conviction records of African Americans who were prosecuted
in an attempt to discourage them from exercising their right to vote.120 A third
court expunged the criminal records of an individual’s conviction after the
government had “destroyed” evidence of entrapment.121 These decisions
strongly represent the tradition of federal courts expunging criminal records only
under the most extraordinary circumstances, even when it comes to a
constitutional violation.122
2. State Courts
Similar to how state courts take a wide variety of approaches when it comes
to their power to expunge criminal records absent the express statutory
authority,123 they also differ in their views of their authority to act when there is
a constitutional violation. A number of state courts take a similar approach to
117
United States v. Haslett, No. 2:83–cr–37–1, 2009 WL 819004, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009)
(summarizing Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014–15).
118
See Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734,
750 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. 614, 624–25 (D.D.C. 1978).
119
Sullivan, 478 F.2d at 971; see also Urban v. Breier, 401 F. Supp. 706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (ordering
the records of fifty-four suspect members of a known motorcycle gang to be expunged because they were
arrested without probable cause); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 214–16 (W.D. Mich. 1971)
(expunging records of an arrest under a statute that was later held unconstitutional).
120
McLeod, 385 F.2d at 750.
121
Benlizar, 459 F. Supp. at 624–25 (holding that the government conduct was “reprehensible” and
expunged the defendant’s criminal record).
122
There is an interesting strand of case law in the Sixth Circuit that maintains, in response to a habeas
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2012), a federal court has the authority to expunge state criminal convictions.
E.g., Gentry v. Deuth, 456 F.3d 687, 696–97 (6th Cir. 2006). In Gentry, the petitioner filed a habeas petition
alleging that in her conviction her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights were violated. Id. at 690–91.
The district court granted the petitioner’s request and nullified her conviction. Id. at 691. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit ordered the expungement of the petitioner’s state criminal record. Id. at 696–97. The court held “the law
is absolutely clear that the writ releases the successful petitioner from the states custody . . . relief from the
collateral consequences of an unconstitutionally obtained state criminal conviction effectively requires
expungement of the conviction from the petitioner’s record.” Id. However, the relief granted by the court in
Gentry was not total. The nullification of the petitioner’s conviction did not preclude the Commonwealth from
retrying the petitioner. Id. at 697.
123
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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federal courts and will only expunge criminal records when there has been an
unlawful arrest or conviction.124 One court noted that “courts ‘may order
expunction in cases where there has been an unlawful arrest, where an arrest has
been made merely for harassment purposes, or where the statute under which an
individual was prosecuted has subsequently been determined to be
unconstitutional.’”125
A Texas appellate court, on the other hand, took a markedly different
approach from the majority of courts.126 The Texas court viewed expungement
as neither a constitutional nor a common law issue.127 Instead, the court believed
the sole judicial authority to expunge criminal records was created by statute.128
Although a Texas statute provides for the expungement of records in an array of
circumstances,129 Texas courts lack the flexibility to equitably expunge records
not covered in the statute.
Other courts have taken a more novel approach. These state courts, in
response to expungement petitions, hold that in some circumstances, public
access to criminal records violates an individual’s right to privacy and thus, the
court will expunge the individual’s records.130 Under this approach, a court
expunged the records of a domestic violence civil protection order where
charges were never filed.131 The court conducted a balancing test, based on the
constitutional right to privacy, that weighed “the interest of the accused in his
good name and right to be free from unwarranted punishment against the
legitimate need of government to maintain records.”132 In balancing, the court

124
Farmer v. State, 235 P.3d 1012, 1015 (Alaska 2010); State v. S.L.H., 755 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.
2008); In re A.N.T., 798 S.E.2d 623, 628 (W. Va. 2017); see also State v. Howe, 308 N.W.2d 743, 748–49 (N.D.
1981) (holding that courts have the “obligation” to expunge the records of someone that was unlawfully
arrested).
125
Farmer, 235 P.3d at 1015 (quoting United States v. G., 774 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985)).
126
See Ex parte Ammons, 550 S.W.3d 235, 237 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018).
127
Id. (quoting Ex parte Myers, 24 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)).
128
Id. (referring to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (West 2017)).
129
See generally TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (West 2017).
130
Davidson v. Dill, 503 P.2d 157, 161 (Colo. 1972) (en banc); Schussheim v. Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d
446, 448 (Ohio 2013) (noting a basis of authority to expunge criminal records is the right to privacy).
131
Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d at 449–50.
132
Id. at 449 (quoting City of Piper Pike v. Doe, 421 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Ohio 1981), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Radcliff, 28 N.E.3d 69 (Ohio 2015)). A similar balancing test was adopted in Davidson, 503
P.2d at 161. In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded a lower court’s decision to dismiss,
for failure to state a claim, an individual’s petition to expunge her criminal records. Id. at 158. The supreme
court ordered the lower court to balance “the state’s interest in efficient law enforcement procedures as against
a particular citizen’s right to be let alone.” Id. at 162–63.
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found that the petitioner’s interest “outweigh[ed] the legitimate need of the
government to maintain records.”133
Although the right to privacy argument has largely been rejected by federal
courts,134 the balancing tests these courts employ provide a useful framework
for federal courts, sitting in equity, and legislatures, state and federal, to
construct a general expungement statute. Moreover, these tests are not that
distinct from the test for injunctions noted above.135 Stressing and balancing the
interests of the party petitioning for expungement with the government’s
interests in protecting the public provides a court with the flexibility necessary
to grant relief in the appropriate circumstances.136
III. OVERVIEW OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AND THE
KOKKONEN DECISION
As discussed above, the consequences of an arrest or criminal record, in
some respects, has the real potential to be a scarlet letter. There is a glaring need
for a mechanism that, in limited circumstances, provides an individual with a
record the opportunity to have that record expunged for considerations of equity
and fundamental fairness alone. Under the current state of the law, the doctrine
of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction should provide courts with an avenue to
equitably expunge criminal records. This Part will first provide a definition of
ancillary jurisdiction along with a brief history of the doctrine. Second, this Part
gives an overview of the circumstances in which ancillary jurisdiction has
traditionally been asserted. Third, this Part will review the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America. Finally, this
Part will analyze case law the Court relied upon in setting forth the two-pronged
ancillary jurisdiction inquiry.
A. Ancillary Jurisdiction
“[F]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”137 A federal court may
properly assert jurisdiction only if the court has subject matter jurisdiction.138
This jurisdiction is limited to two potential sources: (1) the Constitution or (2) a
133

Schussheim, 998 N.E.2d at 449.
See, e.g., Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[G]overnment disclosures of arrest
records, judicial proceedings, and information contained in police reports do not implicate the right to privacy.”
(citations omitted)).
135
Supra note 72 and accompanying text.
136
For a suggested ten-factor balancing test, see Kessler, supra note 13, at 436.
137
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978).
138
13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.
134
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federal statute.139 Once a case invokes the court’s jurisdiction,140 however, a
federal court has the authority to hear actions that are ancillary to the original
case.141 These “ancillary” proceedings, on their own, do not need to invoke a
federal courts original jurisdiction.142
The ancillary jurisdiction doctrine developed with an eye towards protecting
the interests of both parties and nonparties from infringement by any individual
that has invoked a court’s jurisdiction.143 Accordingly, one of the chief focuses
of ancillary jurisdiction is to allow a court to give complete relief between the
parties and to avoid duplicative or piecemeal litigation.144 In an attempt to codify
ancillary jurisdiction, Congress enacted a statute that labeled ancillary
jurisdiction as “supplemental jurisdiction.”145 The language of the statute grants
a federal court the authority to entertain “all claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy.”146
Although Congress codified part of what was recognized as ancillary
jurisdiction, a common law version of ancillary jurisdiction—or “ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction”—still exists.147 Quoting a leading treatise, the Fourth
Circuit delineated between what was codified in the supplemental jurisdiction
statute and what remained in the common law version.148 The court stated,
139

Id.
See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE §§ 3601–3610 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13E FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE] (diversity of
citizenship) and 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 3561–3566 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 13D FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE] (federal question) for a comprehensive discussion of a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
141
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934).
142
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1976); 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92,
§ 3523.2.
143
See Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 579 (2005) (“Ancillary jurisdiction
evolved primarily to protect defending parties, or others whose rights might be adversely affected if they could
not air their claims in an ongoing federal action.”); United States v. Mettetal, 714 Fed. App’x 230, 234 (4th Cir.
2017) (same).
144
George B. Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D.
27, 27 (1964).
145
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); see 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2.
146
§ 1367(a). The excerpt quoted above pertains to federal question actions. When the action invoking
federal jurisdiction is in diversity, Congress has carved out certain situations where a federal court may not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See § 1367(b). These carve outs include “claims by plaintiffs against persons
made parties under Rule 14 [(interpleader)], 19 [(necessary parties)], 20 [(permissive joinder)], or 24
[(intervention)] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as
plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules . . . .” Id.
147
13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2 (explaining that it is “clear” that this
version of ancillary jurisdiction was not altered by the passage of the supplemental jurisdiction statute).
148
Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 13 FEDERAL
140
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“[a]lthough § 1367 governs ancillary jurisdiction over claims asserted in a case
. . . it does not affect common law ancillary jurisdiction ‘over related
proceedings that are technically separate from the initial case that invoked
federal subject matter jurisdiction,’ which remains governed by case law.”149 In
other words, the supplemental jurisdiction statute applies to individual claims in
a case, whereas common law ancillary jurisdiction applies to the controversy
more generally.150
B. Traditional Exercises of Ancillary Jurisdiction
A traditional manner in which ancillary jurisdiction had been asserted,
codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute,151 is over related claims that
themselves do not invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court.152
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange is thought by scholars to be a substantial
expansion of this doctrine.153 Prior to the Court’s decision in Moore, ancillary
jurisdiction, according to the Supreme Court case law, could only be asserted if
it related to “property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the courts
possession or control by the principal suit.”154 Conversely, after Moore, for a
court to have the authority over an ancillary claim it only need to arise out of the
event that precipitated the original action.155
This exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, codified in the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, is distinct from the common law ancillary jurisdiction, or
ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, doctrine which has survived the passage of
the supplemental jurisdiction statute.156 The ancillary enforcement jurisdiction
doctrine gives courts authority over “related proceedings,”157 which courts have
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2); see Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 354 n.5 (1996) (noting
that “much of,” but not all, the common law ancillary jurisdiction doctrine was codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
149
See Robb Evans & Assocs., 609 F.3d at 363 (quoting 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note
92, § 3523.2 (emphasis in original)); see also Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 784 (3d Cir.
1995) (recognizing that the supplemental jurisdiction statute codified “some forms of ‘ancillary jurisdiction’”).
150
See Robb Evans & Assocs., 609 F.3d at 363.
151
See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2.
152
See, e.g., Sandlin v. Corp. Interiors Inc., 972 F.2d 1212, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
district court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction “over certain cross-claims, counter claims and third-party claims
that are related to the principle case”); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d
Cir. 1961) (citing Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 607–09 (1926)).
153
See, e.g., 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523 (noting that the Moore holding
was a “major expansion” of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine).
154
See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2 n.10.
155
Moore, 270 U.S. at 610.
156
See 13 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2.
157
Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 13 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 92, § 3523.2).
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exercised in a variety of circumstances. One scenario where a federal court
retains enforcement jurisdiction, or has “inherent authority” to act, is to
implement the court’s orders.158 This authority allows a federal court to cast a
wide net over proceedings related to the original action, including over
proceedings involving a third party.159
For example, in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, a bankruptcy court order discharged
the respondent “from all provable debts.”160 Subsequently, the petitioner, to
whom the respondent owed money, filed an action in state court to recover the
money that he loaned to the respondent.161 In response, the respondent returned
to the bankruptcy court that had discharged him from his debts and pled the court
to enjoin the petitioner from pursuing the state court action.162 The bankruptcy
court sided with the respondent and the petitioner appealed, claiming that the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to preclude him from asserting a claim in
state court.163 Ultimately, on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the bankruptcy
court’s ruling.164 The Supreme Court reasoned that, because the bankruptcy
court was acting “in aid of and to effectuate [an] adjudication” previously
rendered, the bankruptcy court retained the authority to enjoin the defendant
from pursuing the state court action.165
In addition to implementing a court order against a third party, courts may
exercise ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to resolve disputes between attorneys
and their clients.166 A court has jurisdiction to entertain these disputes despite
158
See generally Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994) (holding that
ancillary jurisdiction has typically been asserted to “effectuate” the courts judgments); Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) (sanctioning a party for bad-faith conduct through the court’s inherent authority to
“vindicat[e] [its] judicial authority”); Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946) (noting
it is unquestionable that a federal court has the inherent power “to investigate whether a judgment was obtained
by fraud” (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248–49 (1944))); Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934) (holding a federal court retains jurisdiction to enforce its orders to “preserve
the fruits and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered”).
159
See, e.g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1996). According to the Court, the proceedings
involving third parties “includ[e] attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudicial avoidance of
fraudulent conveyances.” Id.
160
Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 238.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 245.
165
Id. at 239–42.
166
See, e.g., K.C. ex rel. Erica C. v. Torlakson, 762 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that there is
“no debate” a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction, even after the litigation has ended, “over attorney fee
disputes collateral to the underlying litigation” (quoting Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ferrante, 364 F.3d 1037,
1041 (9th Cir. 2004))); Levitt v. Brooks, 669 F.3d 100, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that it is “well settled” a
federal court may hear fee disputes (quoting Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1991)));
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the notion that these proceedings are entirely separate from the proceeding that
initially invoked the court’s jurisdiction.167 Furthermore, these proceedings are
usually governed by state contract law, not by federal law.168 A prime example
of a court entertaining an attorney-client dispute is the Second Circuit’s decision
in Levitt v. Brooks.169
In Levitt, an accused criminal defendant ran out of funds and ceased paying
his attorney’s bills during his trial.170 The attorney therefore moved for the
district court to require the criminal defendant to pay his fee.171 On appeal, the
appellate court held that the district court did not err in asserting ancillary
jurisdiction.172 The court reasoned that the district court had ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction to effectively manage the case by “ensur[ing]
defendant does not become indigent and that he has representation throughout
the proceedings.”173
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court has jurisdiction
over attorney’s fees disputes even when the underlying case is moot.174 In
Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Co. there was a dispute over the amount of
attorney’s fees the plaintiffs’ attorney was to receive in an approved class action
settlement.175 The plaintiffs’ attorneys argued that the district court did not have
the jurisdiction to revise the award of attorney’s fees granted in the settlement
agreement because the case was moot.176 The Ninth Circuit held that the district
court had the authority to alter the award of attorney’s fees because the “district
court retains equitable jurisdiction even when the underlying case is moot”
because its jurisdiction “outlasts the case or controversy.”177

see also Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 241 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he continuing collection of appellants
filing fees is ancillary to the court’s original jurisdiction over Torres’s appeals . . . .”).
167
E.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) (citing White v. N.H. Dep’t of
Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13 (1982)).
168
E.g., Novinger v. E.I. Dupont Nemours & Co., 809 F.2d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Attorneys’ fee
arrangements . . . are matters primarily of state contract law.”).
169
Levitt, 669 F.3d at 101–03.
170
Id. at 102–03.
171
Id. at 102. The court also noted there is a consensus that a court has ancillary jurisdiction to resolve fee
disputes when it is relevant to the “main action.” Id. at 103 (quoting Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d
60, 64 (2d Cir. 1991)).
172
Id. at 103.
173
Id.
174
Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1329 (9th Cir. 1999).
175
Id. at 1325.
176
Id. at 1325–26, 1329.
177
Id. at 1329.
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These decisions exemplify a court’s utilization of ancillary enforcement
jurisdiction over collateral proceedings and the potential breadth of the
doctrine.178 In Local Loan Co., a court was able to enjoin a third party from
pursuing a separate action in a different court because it was effectuating an
adjudication.179 Further, the attorney–client disputes in Levitt and Zucker had
little or nothing to do with the substance of the action that invoked the court’s
jurisdiction.180 Nonetheless courts routinely exercise their discretion to resolve
these disputes which are collateral to the original proceeding because “[i]t is well
established that a federal court may consider collateral issues” and motions for
attorney’s fees are “supplemental to the original proceeding.”181
C. The Kokkonen Decision
Although there are some relatively well-defined areas in which a court may
exercise the ancillary enforcement jurisdiction that survived the passage of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, there is confusion surrounding how far it
reaches.182 This lack of clarity was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in
Kokkonen.183 The Court recognized that “[t]he doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
can hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise,” and attempted to
provide a narrower definition for when a court may exercise it.184
In Kokkonen, the parties reached an oral settlement agreement after their
closing arguments at trial.185 Because they had settled all claims and
counterclaims, “the parties executed,” and the district judge signed, “a
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice” f or the claims and the

178
See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 238 (1934); Levitt v. Brooks, 669 F.3d 100, 100–04 (2nd
Cir. 2012); Zucker, 192 F.3d at 1325–29.
179
Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 239–42.
180
Levitt, 669 F.3d at 100–04; Zucker, 192 F.3d at 1325–29.
181
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank,
307 U.S. 161, 170 (1939)).
182
E.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“At least so far as we are
aware no court has ever tried to fix [the limits of ancillary jurisdiction] with any degree of precision.”); 13
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE §3523.2 (3rd ed. 2008) (noting that the concept of ancillary jurisdiction has “uncertain limits”);
Fraser, supra note 145 (observing that the limits of ancillary jurisdiction are “not clear”).
183
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994).
184
Id. at 379–80. The court stated that prior to Kokkonen, it had only provided “limited description[s]” in
dicta regarding the scope of ancillary jurisdictions that were “equally inaccurate.” Id. at 378–79 (discussing
Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904) and Fulton Nat’l Bank v. Hozier Intervener, 267 U.S.
276, 280 (1925)).
185
Id. at 376–77
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counterclaims.186 The court’s order, however, neither incorporated nor
referenced the parties’ settlement agreement in any capacity.187
Unsurprisingly, a dispute arose concerning the terms of the oral settlement
agreement.188 As a result, the respondent requested that the district court enforce
the terms of the settlement agreement, and the petitioner objected, asserting that
the district court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the agreement because it
was not referenced in the Court’s order.189 The district court and the court of
appeals, siding with the respondent, both held that a federal court has the
“inherent” authority to enforce settlement agreements in a case or controversy
over which they have original jurisdiction.190 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.191
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court explained that because the
respondent was requesting the court to enforce the settlement agreement, and
not to continue or renew the original suit, the enforcement of the settlement
agreement “require[d] its own basis for jurisdiction.”192 The respondent,
however, argued that the court had ancillary jurisdiction over the enforcement
of the agreement via the dismissal of the original suit, and therefore, the
agreement did not need to invoke the original jurisdiction of the court.193 To
buttress its argument, the respondent relied upon language in the Court’s prior
holding in Julian v. Central Trust Co.194 The Court found that argument
unpersuasive, explaining that the holding in Julian is not as “permissive” as its
language suggests because in that case, the court “expressly reserved
jurisdiction.”195

186

Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 377.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. A federal court has original subject matter jurisdiction when it is granted jurisdiction either by (1)
statute or (2) the constitution. Supra note 140 and accompanying text.
192
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378.
193
Id. at 378. A claim or proceeding need not invoke the courts original jurisdiction if it is ancillary or
collateral to the original claim invoking the court’s jurisdiction. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 10 (1976);
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934); ; 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD
H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §3523.2 (3rd ed. 2008).
194
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378. The language the respondent relied upon was the court’s assertion that “[a]
bill filed to continue a former litigation in the same court . . . to obtain and secure the fruits, benefits and
advantages of the proceedings and judgment in a former suit in the same court by the same or additional parties
. . . or to obtain any equitable relief in regard to, or connected with, or growing out of, any judgment or
proceeding at law rendered in the same court . . . is an ancillary suit.” Id. (quoting Julian v. Central Trust Co.,
193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904)).
195
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379 (emphasis in original).
187
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Accordingly, because the district court did not reserve jurisdiction or
incorporate the settlement agreement into the order dismissing the claims, the
court held that the district court did not have ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement.196 In reaching its conclusion, the court enumerated what
came to be the two-pronged inquiry to decide if a court has ancillary
jurisdiction:197
Generally speaking, we have asserted ancillary jurisdiction (in the very
broad sense in which that term is sometimes used) for two separate,
though sometimes related purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a
single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees
factually independent . . . and (2) to enable the court to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority,
and effectuate its decrees. . . .198

In addressing the first prong, the Court reasoned that the petitioner’s claim
for breach of the settlement agreement and the respondent’s substantive claim
which had invoked jurisdiction “have nothing to do with each other.”199 Because
of this lack of interconnectedness, the Court held that ancillary jurisdiction could
not be invoked under the first prong.200 In analyzing second prong, the Supreme
Court found the fact that the district court did not expressly reserve jurisdiction
over settlement agreement to be dispositive.201 The Court explained the because
196
Id. at 381. Because the district court could not assert ancillary jurisdiction and therefore the respondents
claim was, in effect, simply a breach of contract claim, the court held that the settlement agreement had to be
enforced through the state court system. Id. Up until this point in time there was a circuit split as to whether a
court retained ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement that was not incorporated into the court’s
order dismissing the action. Compare Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding a
district court does not have jurisdiction to enforce an unincorporated settlement agreement), and Fairfax
Countywide Citizens Ass’n v. Cty. Of Fairfax, 571 F.2d 1299, 1303 (4th Cir. 1978) (same), and Langley v.
Jackson St. Univ., 14 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (5th Cir. 1994) (same), Adduono v. World Hockey Ass’n 824 F.2d
617, 621–22 (8th Cir. 1987) (same), and McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1189–90 (7th Cir. 1985)
(requiring explicit retention of jurisdiction), with Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 92-11628,
1993 WL 164884, at *1 (9th Cir. May 18, 1993) (holding the district court had the ‘inherent power” to enforce
the settlement agreement despite it not being incorporated into the order dismissing the action), and Dankese v.
Defense Logistics Agency 693 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding, without specifying if the agreement must
be incorporated into the order, that the trial court retains authority to “enforce settlement agreements entered
into by parties . . . before the court”), and Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1371 (6th Cir. 1976)
(same), and Kent v. Baker, 815 F.2d 1395, 1398–1400 (11th Cir. 1987) (same).
197
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
198
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80 (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812); 13 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE §3523 (3rd ed. 2008)).
199
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 380–81. The court additionally noted that the district court could have retained jurisdiction by
incorporating the agreement into the order of dismissal or by including a provision specifically “retaining
jurisdiction.” Id. at 381
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the district court did not include the settlement agreement in the order, it could
hardly be claimed that enforcing the settlement agreement would be “require[d]
in order [for a court] to perform their functions.”202 Because jurisdiction was not
supported by either prong, the Court held that the district court improperly
asserted jurisdiction.203
Although the two prongs of Kokkonen provide more clarity and structure to
the ancillary jurisdiction analysis, in enumerating these prongs, the court used
rather ambiguous language.204 For example, in introducing the two prongs, the
court stated, “Generally speaking, we have asserted ancillary jurisdiction (in the
very broad sense in which that term is sometimes used) for two separate, though
sometimes related purposes. . . .”205 On its face, it seems clear that the Court was
not intending to set out an entirely new standard for ancillary jurisdiction, nor
was the court attempting to establish concrete outer limits of the doctrine.206 The
court left the outer limits of ancillary jurisdiction to be decided on a case-bycase basis. The Second Circuit, citing Kokkonen, recognized the remaining
ambiguity in a 2006 decision: “[T]he boundaries of ancillary jurisdiction are not
easily defined and the cases addressing it are hardly a model of clarity.”207
D. The Two Prongs of Kokkonen
The Kokkonen decision added some clarity to the murky ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction doctrine, but besides the enforcement of settlement
agreements and the exact language of the prongs, the Supreme Court provided
little guidance on how far each of the prongs extend.208 Moreover, the Court did
not create a test or set out factors to determine whether a claim or proceeding
falls under either of the two prongs.209 What the Court did do, however, was
plant citations at the tail end of each factor in what seems to be an attempt to
impart some guidance on the scope of the test.210 This Section will, in turn,
examine the case law the Court cited after each prong.
The first prong in the Kokkonen inquiry authorizes a federal court to assert
ancillary jurisdiction to “permit disposition by a single court of claims that are,
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 379.
See id.
Garcia v. Teitler 443 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2006).
See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–82.
See id.
See id. at 379–80.
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in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent. . . .”211 This language
is similar to the supplemental jurisdiction statute that was passed roughly four
years prior to this decision.212 That being said, the Court did not cite to the
supplemental jurisdiction statute after the first prong,213 and therefore was
referencing the version of ancillary jurisdiction that survived the passage of the
supplemental jurisdiction statute.214 Thus, it is unclear whether that prong is
intended to be as broad or broader than the statutory grant of supplemental
jurisdiction. The court did, however, cite to Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc. and
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange in support of this prong.215
In Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., the petitioner was a trustee of a railroad
company that was in bankruptcy reorganization.216 The trustee brought a claim
against the respondent for a debt that it owed to the railroad company and the
respondent filed a counterclaim.217 The petitioners, at the district court, filed a
motion for summary judgment and asked the court to set off their claim with the
respondent’s claim.218 The district court granted summary judgment and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed.219
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a conflict between the
Seventh Circuit holding and separate Third Circuit and Supreme Court decisions
in which claims were not permitted to offset against the petitioner.220 Unrelated
to the purview of this Comment, the Supreme Court reversed.221 Pertinent,
however, was the Court’s discussion regarding jurisdiction over
counterclaims.222 The Court, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 noted
211

Id.
See generally, 28 U.S.C. 1367 (2012); 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H.
COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3567 (3rd ed. 2008) (“[T]his form of
jurisdiction permits a federal court to entertain a claim over which it would have no independent basis of subject
matter jurisdiction.”).
213
See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
214
E.g., 13 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 3523.2 (3rd ed. 2008).
215
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
216
Baker v. Gold Seal Liqours, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 468 (1974). According to Black’s Law Dictionary,
“when bankruptcy is file[d] [bankruptcy reorganization] occurs. The company is analyzed by a trustee to
liquidate assets and pay off claims.” What is Reorganization?, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, https://
thelawdictionary.org/reorganization/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
217
Baker, 417 U.S. at 468.
218
Id. This would have resulted in a net gain for the respondent of over 11,000 dollars. Id.
219
Id.
220
See generally id. The conflict between Baker and the Third Circuit and Supreme Court cases is not
relevant to the discussion of ancillary jurisdiction.
221
Id. The Supreme Court reversed because the district court and court of appeals’ holdings resulted in a
form of discrimination against creditors that §77 of the Bankruptcy Act precluded. Id. at 474.
222
See id. at 469 n.1.
212
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that “[i]f a counterclaim is compulsory, the federal court will have ancillary
jurisdiction over it even though ordinarily it would be a matter for a state
court. . . .”223 The Court further noted that under Rule 13(b), a party may assert
a counterclaim even if it doesn’t arise from the same “transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing parties claim.”224
Furthermore, in Moore, the plaintiff’s original claim properly invoked the
court’s jurisdiction under a federal statute.225 The defendant asserted a
counterclaim that did not itself invoke the court’s jurisdiction.226 The district
court dismissed the original claim by the plaintiff and despite not having original
jurisdiction over the defendant’s counterclaim, entered an order granting the
counterclaim.227 The Supreme Court, in affirming the district and appellate
courts, held that the district court had properly asserted jurisdiction over the
counterclaim because it was so closely intertwined with the claim originally
invoking the court’s jurisdiction.228
The first Kokkonen prong, in the context of the court’s holdings in Baker and
Moore, which both involve counterclaims, appears to track the federal court’s
authority to entertain counterclaims pursuant to Rule 13.229 The widest grant of
jurisdiction in Rule 13 is for permissive counterclaims under subpart (b) of the
rule.230 A court’s authority to hear permissive counterclaims under Rule 13(b)
stems from the statutory grant of supplemental jurisdiction which allows a
223

Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a).
Baker, 417 U.S. at 469 n.1. However, if the counterclaim does not arise from the same transaction or
occurrence, it is therefore not compulsory, and either has to invoke the court’s jurisdiction itself, or qualify under
supplemental jurisdiction to be heard by a district court. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1422 (3rd ed. 2010) (explaining that permissive counterclaim
must independently invoke the court’s jurisdiction or fall under the supplemental jurisdiction statute or, in some
circuits, qualify as a setoff). The test for supplemental jurisdiction is fittingly boarder than the transaction or
occurrence inquiry for Rule 13(a). See id. Supplemental jurisdiction permits a federal court to resolve claims
that are part of the same case or controversy as the claim originally invoking the court’s jurisdiction. See id.
(“[I]f a counterclaim is permissive it . . . nonetheless may qualify for supplemental jurisdiction if . . . it may be
deemed part of the same controversy.”); Michelle S. Simon, Defining the Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367: A Hearty Welcome to Permissive Counterclaims, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 295, 306
(2005) (noting that the supplemental jurisdiction statute “extended supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional
limitation of ‘case or controversy’ under Article III”).
225
Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 604 (1926).
226
Id. at 607–09.
227
Id. at 603.
228
Id. at 610.
229
See Baker, 417 U.S. at 469, n.1; Moore, 270 U.S. at 610 (Moore was decided prior to the passage of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); FED. R. CIV. P. 13.
230
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). Compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) require a party to assert the
counterclaim if it arises from the same transaction or occurrence as the event invoking the court’s jurisdiction.
Supra note 228.
224
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federal court to hear claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the
primary claim.231 Nevertheless, the court did not mention Rule 13 at any point
in the opinion.232 Therefore, in citing to Baker and Moore, it is unclear whether
the court intended the outer limits of the first prong to extend as far as, or farther
than, the outer limits of permissive counterclaims under Rule 13(b).233
The language of the first prong could be construed to support a court’s
exercise of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction that is broader than the grant of
supplemental jurisdiction for a few reasons. First, the fact that the Court did not
employ any of the language found in the supplemental jurisdiction statute or
Rule 13,234 which were both effective at the time of the decision,235 indicates
that the court did not intend to confine the first prong to the jurisdictional limits
of either.236 Second, the language authorizing a court to resolve claims that are
“in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent,” is notably
permissive.237 Lastly, there is no temporal component, unlike a Rule 13
counterclaim which must be asserted during the original case, to the first
prong.238 Hence, a claim related to the original case or controversy conceivably
might be asserted several years down the line.239
The second Kokkonen prong permits a federal court to assert ancillary
enforcement jurisdiction “to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to
manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees. . . .”240 In Kokkonen, the fact that the respondent was asking the Court
to enforce a settlement agreement that was not incorporated into the Court’s
order was the driving force behind the Court’s holding that it did not have
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.241 In support of the Supreme Court’s
assertion that a federal court retains ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its orders,

231

Supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
233
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
234
See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
235
Supplemental jurisdiction statute was passed in 1990. 28 U.S.C. §1367 (2012). And Rule 13 was
adopted in 1937. FED R. CIV. P. 13.
236
See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
237
See id.
238
See id.
239
See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) (“[E]ven ‘years after the entry
of a judgment on the merits’ a federal court could consider an award of counsel fees.” (quoting White v. N.H.
Dep’t. of Emp’t Security, 455 U.S. 445, 451 n.13 (1982))).
240
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812)).
241
Id. at 376–77. The court dismissed the respondent’s assertion that this fell under the first prong rather
swiftly and effortlessly. Id. at 380–81.
232
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the Court cited to its decisions, discussed in greater detail below, in United States
v. Hudson and Chambers v. NASCO.242
The Hudson decision was rendered not long after the Constitution was
passed and was a catalyst for the idea of “inherent power” in federal courts.243
The question presented to the Court was whether a federal court could hear statelaw criminal actions.244 In resolving this question, the Court acknowledged that
because Congress has the authority to create inferior courts,245 Congress could
necessarily limit them.246 That being said, the Court acknowledged that there are
“[c]ertain implied powers [that] must necessarily result to our Courts of justice
from the nature of their institution.”247 The Court further went on to say that
there “are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others . . . .”248 In other words, the Supreme Court
recognized that for the judicial branch to have any backbone, some implied
powers must inevitably flow directly from their grant of authority.249 Despite
being drafted in 1812, these statements were immensely important to the
development of a federal court’s authority to exercise “inherent power” to carry
out its judgments.
The issue of a court’s “inherent power” also arose in Chambers v. NASCO.250
In Chambers, throughout the course of “a simple action for specific performance
of a contract,” the petitioner and his counsel “emasculated and frustrated the
purposes of these rules and the powers of the District Court . . . to prevent [the
respondent’s] access to the remedy of specific performance.”251 Accordingly,
after repeated egregious actions and misconduct by the petitioner and repeated
threats of sanctions,252 the respondent moved for sanctions to be imposed.253
242

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
The decision was rendered in 1812. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
244
Id. at 32. The court ultimately held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 34.
245
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
246
Hudson, 11 U.S. at 33.
247
Id. at 34.
248
Id.
249
See id.
250
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991)..
251
Id. at 35–36 (citing NASCO Inc., v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372, 1383 (W.D.
La. 1985)).
252
Id. at 36–41. The actions of the petitioner and their counsel can be summed up as: “(1) attempt[ing] to
deprive this Court of jurisdiction by acts of fraud, nearly all of which were performed outside the confines of
this Court, (2) fil[ing] false and frivolous pleadings, and (3) attempt[ing], by other tactics of delay, oppression,
harassment and massive expense to reduce plaintiff to exhausted compliance.” Id. at 41 (quoting NASCO, Inc.
v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 (W.D. La. 1989), aff’d and remanded, 894 F.2d 696
(5th Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)).
253
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 40.
243

SALKY_8.28.20

2020]

8/28/2020 1:28 PM

ANCILLARY ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION

1287

Although the district court recognized neither statutes nor the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provided it with authority to impose sanctions in this situation,
it nevertheless imposed sanctions, by invoking its “inherent power.”254 By
relying on its inherent power, the district court imposed sanctions “in the form
of attorney’s fees and expenses totaling” almost a million dollars.255
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the district court did not have the
inherent authority to impose sanctions for its conduct, but rather the court needed
to look at state law in determining sanctions because this was a diversity case.256
The court of appeals rejected the petitioner’s argument and stressed that a federal
court’s inherent authority is independent but limited, to be used only when
necessary.257 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “because of the importance”
of the issues in the case.258
The Supreme Court affirmed and provided a lengthy discussion of the
breadth of courts’ inherent power.259 As an initial matter, in response to the
petitioner’s argument that the court could only impose sanctions if given the
authority by the Federal Rules or a statute, the Court explained that, “[t]hese
other mechanisms, taken alone or together, are not substitutes for the inherent
power, for that power is both broader and narrower than the other means of
imposing sanctions.”260 These “implied powers” derive from the court’s need to
have the authority to fully carry out its judgments and to control the parties and
proceedings before the court.261
This inherent authority, according to the Supreme Court, in the context of
attorney’s fees, acts as an exception to the traditional “American Rule” of not
shifting attorney’s fees.262 The exception that applied in this case was the court’s
inherent power to “assess attorney’s fees when a party has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”263 Finding that this exception

254
Id. The statutory authorities that the Court noted did not grant it authority were 28 U.S.C. §1927 (2012)
and the Federal Rule was Rule 11. Id. at 40–42.
255
Id. at 40.
256
Id. at 42.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
See generally id. at 43–55.
260
Id. at 46. The court explained that to effectively carry out its functions, it needed the ability to act, in
some circumstances, outside of the express grants of the Federal Rules and statutes. In support of this, the court
stated that inherent power “extends to a full range of litigation abuses.” Id.
261
See id.
262
The “American Rule” is that the losing party in a case does not have to pay the prevailing party’s
attorney’s fees. Alyeska Pipeline and Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
263
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46. (quoting Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258–59).
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was met, the court held that the use of sanctions “in this instance transcends a
court’s equitable power” and allows the court to “vindicat[e] judicial
authority.”264
In addition to examining the court’s inherent power in the attorney’s fees
context, the Court in Chambers reviewed other areas and circumstances where
courts have traditionally asserted their inherent authority.265 For instance, the
Court expressed that “the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts”
regardless of whether the contempt occurred inside or outside the walls of the
court.266 The Court also noted that a federal court, through the exercise of its
inherent authority, may vacate a judgment it rendered if “fraud has been
perpetrated upon the court.”267 In enumerating these circumstances, the Court
repeatedly stressed that a federal court’s inherent authority should not be
employed liberally and should be exercised with restraint.268
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Hudson and Chambers provide insight on
how expansively to construe the facially broad language of the second Kokkonen
prong.269 Although, the Court articulated in both Hudson and Chambers that
inherent powers should be asserted only in limited circumstances, once a court’s
ability to carry out its functions is impeded, the circumstances under which a
court may assert its inherent powers do not appear all that limited.270 An
impediment to the court’s ability to function properly does not have to be
something that occurred inside the courtroom or relevant to the substantive
claims of the suit.271 Furthermore, what threatens a courts ability to function may
change over time and what is encompassed within the scope of the court’s
authority to enforce its orders is not well-defined. A court may invalidate an
order if it was perpetrated by fraud,272 but may a court lessen the penalty that an
order imposed after a showing that the order resulted in more punishment than
the court had intended to implement?

264

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978)).
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43–44.
266
Id. at 44 (citing Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1874)).
267
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44. In addition to circumstances noted in the text above, the court noted several
other circumstances where a federal court may assert its inherent power. These circumstances include, inter alia:
forbidding a disruptive criminal defendant from reentering the court room, “dismiss[ing] a suit for failure to
prosecute,” and “the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Id.
at 43–44.
268
Id. at 44–46.
269
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994).
270
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–45; Hudson 11 U.S. at 34.
271
See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.
272
Universal Oil Prod. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
265
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IV. EQUITABLE EXPUNGEMENT BEFORE AND AFTER KOKKONEN
Before Kokkonen, it was well-settled amongst the circuit courts of appeal
that a federal court retained ancillary enforcement jurisdiction and had the
inherent power to expunge records based solely on equitable considerations.273
A court, sitting in equity, would only grant expungement petitions in rare or
extreme circumstances, balancing public policy considerations with the burden
to the person with the record.274 However, after Kokkonen, the federal circuits
began holding that expunging criminal records solely for equitable
considerations did not fall under either of the two prongs enumerated in
Kokkonen.275
This Part will first discuss specific cases, prior to Kokkonen, that held federal
courts had ancillary jurisdiction to expunge criminal records solely based on
equitable considerations and provide examples of the balancing tests these
courts used. Second, this Part will discuss the case law after Kokkonen that
interpreted the two prongs to preclude the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. Last,
this Part will examine the decisions, mostly in the district courts in the Fourth
Circuit, that have interpreted the second prong of Kokkonen to allow a court to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction.
A. Equitable Expungement Prior to Kokkonen
This Section will examine pre-Kokkonen cases from the Second,276
Seventh,277 and Eighth Circuits278 holding that a federal court has the inherent
authority to expunge criminal records solely under equitable considerations.
These same Circuits, however, subsequently found that Kokkonen overruled
these prior decisions.279 After reviewing the pre-Kokkonen cases, this Section

273
See, e.g., United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 817–18 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding the district court
has the authority to expunge records in narrow circumstances); Allen v. Webster, 742 F.2d 153, 154–55
(4th Cir. 1984) (holding the district court, in equity, did not abuse its discretion in denying a expungement
petition based on equitable considerations); United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding
that absent a statute, expungement of criminal records “lies within the equitable discretion of the court”).
274
See, e.g., Friesen, 853 F.2d at 817; Allen, 742 F.2d at 155; Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539.
275
See, e.g., United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Coloian, 480
F.3d 47, 50–52 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). The 4th and D.C.
Circuits have not spoken on this issue.
276
Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539.
277
United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). Although Flowers was decided in 2004,
after Kokkonen, the court in Flowers did not consider Kokkonen in its decision and relied on prior precedent
within the circuit. See id. at 739. Hence, this case is being treated as if it were decided prior to Kokkonen.
278
United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1990).
279
See infra notes 332–356 and accompanying text; Meyer 439 F.3d at 861–62.
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will then discuss a narrow strand of district court case law where the government
supports the expungement motion and jurisdiction to expunge records has been
maintained.
In the Second Circuit, before Kokkonen, it was well-settled that a federal
court had the inherent authority to expunge criminal records based solely on
equitable considerations.280 In United States v. Schnitzer, the appellant was
accused of conspiring with another party to defraud the Federal Insurance
Administration and turned himself into the FBI.281 The FBI subsequently took
the appellant’s photographs and thumbprints.282 The other party pled guilty, and
the criminal charges were dropped against the appellant and instead, a civil
action, that would later be dismissed, was filed by the government against the
appellant.283 As part of the original criminal action against the appellant, he filed
a petition for his records to be expunged as well as the photographs and
fingerprints that were taken to be returned.284 After balancing the government’s
and law enforcement’s interests against the appellants, the district court denied
the petition.285
On appeal, the appellant asserted that the district court lacked ancillary
jurisdiction and because the criminal charges were dropped and civil suit was
dismissed, his petition for expungement should have been sent to the Department
of Justice and the FBI.286 In response, the Second Circuit explained that,
irrespective of statutory authority, the criminal proceedings were rightfully
within the jurisdiction of the district court.287 The Second Circuit further noted
that “[a] court, sitting in a criminal prosecution, has ancillary jurisdiction to issue
protective orders regarding dissemination of arrest records,”288 and made clear
that a district court judge would have ancillary jurisdiction over any civil suit
that was “related to the criminal action.”289 Ultimately the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision and explained that expungement is only to
be granted after the court has considered the “delicate balancing of the equities

280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

E.g., Schintzer, 567 F.2d at 539.
Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 537.
Id.
Id. at 537–38.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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between the right of privacy of the individual and the right of law enforcement
officials to perform their necessary duties.”290
Likewise, in another pre-Kokkonen case, the Seventh Circuit reversed a
district court’s grant of an expungement petition by reaching a similar
conclusion to the court in Schnitzer. In United States v. Flowers, the appellee
petitioned the district court to have her criminal records expunged to avoid any
future employment barriers.291 The criminal record the appellee was attempting
to have expunged was a guilty plea to “interfering with housing rights on the
account of race” when she was eighteen.292 The district court found that the
appellee had rehabilitated herself and that her interest in having her records
expunged outweighed the public interest in preserving her records.293 Thus, the
district court ordered the expunction of the record of her plea.294
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the court had jurisdiction to
hear the expungement petition295 but nonetheless held that the district court
abused its discretion in granting expungement to the appellee.296 The court
reasoned that the “unwarranted adverse consequences”297 required to grant an
expungement petition were not present because the appellee did not supply the
court with sufficient evidence to outweigh the public interest.298 The exercise of
jurisdiction in this case is distinct from the exercise in Schnitzer.299 Here, the
expungement petition was filed nearly eight years after the conclusion of the
original case and primarily concerned actions that occurred after the original
case concluded and actions that might occur in the future.300 This distinction is
significant because the court in Flowers retained jurisdiction over an
expungement petition where its relation to the original action was tenuous both
temporally and in substance.301
Further, in United States v. Bagley, another pre-Kokkonen case, the Eighth
Circuit recognized the district court’s inherent jurisdiction to consider
290

Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. Rosen 343 F. Supp 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 738 (7th Cir. 2004).
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id. at 739.
296
Id. at 740.
297
Id. at 739.
298
Id. at 740.
299
In Schnitzer, the expungement petition was filed during the original criminal action. United States v.
Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 536 (2d Cir. 1977).
300
See Flowers, 389 F.3d at 740.
301
Id.
291
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expungement petitions302 and despite the dubious circumstances surrounding the
petitioner’s arrest, nonetheless denied the petition.303 The evidence that resulted
in the petitioner’s arrest and indictment was discovered in an illegal search.304
Because the evidence was discovered in an illegal search, the district court
granted the petitioner’s motion to suppress and ultimately, dismissed the
indictment against the petitioner.305 With that being said, the district court denied
the petitioner’s motion to expunge.306 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reiterated
that the court had jurisdiction to entertain this motion and affirmed the district
court’s decision because the “adverse consequences” the petitioner showed were
only “minimal.”307
In addition to these three Circuit decisions, some district courts, prior to
Kokkonen, wrestled with equitable expungement in an interesting context. This
context developed regarding the expungement of records for individuals who
were arrested, eventually found innocent, and the government supported the
petitioner’s motion.308 In these exceptional circumstances, where the
government concedes that harm to the defendant significantly outweighs the
benefit to the public, district courts have ordered the expungement of the
defendant’s records.309 However, there has been no appellate decision to date
that has adopted these district court opinions.
B. Equitable Expungement After Kokkonen
After Kokkonen was decided, the prior agreement amongst the circuit courts,
that they had the ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to equitably expunge
criminal records, was called into question. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Kokkonen was intended to clarify the reach of the ancillary jurisdiction
doctrine.310 However, the test the Court adopted in Kokkonen was vague, and it
is unclear if the Court intended the test to be the sole analysis a court should
undertake in determining whether it may exercise ancillary jurisdiction.311
302
United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1990). See United States v. Meyer 439 F.3d 855,
860 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Bagley, 899 F.2d at 707–08) (“We have recognized, in cases predating Kokkonen, an
inherent but narrow power to expunge federal criminal records in extreme cases.”).
303
Bagley, 899 F.2d at 708.
304
Id. at 707.
305
Id.
306
Id. at 708.
307
Id.
308
See United States v. Van Wagner, 746 F. Supp. 619, 621–23 (E.D. Va. 1990); United States v. Cook,
480 F. Supp. 262, 263 (S.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1219–20 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
309
See Van Wagner, 746 F. Supp. at 621–23; Cook, 480 F. Supp. at 263–64; Bohr, 406 F. Supp. at 1220.
310
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994)..
311
Id. at 379-80.
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Regarding expungement under equitable considerations, the Kokkonen decision
resulted in circuit courts reconsidering whether their current position of retaining
jurisdiction was still valid.312 All circuits that have directly addressed313 the issue
have held that in light of Kokkonen, they no longer have the jurisdiction to
entertain expungement petitions based solely on equitable grounds.314
Conversely, there are several district court opinions, mainly in the Fourth,315
Tenth316 and D.C. Circuits317 that buck this trend of determining that courts do
not have jurisdiction to entertain these petitions.
This Section will first analyze decisions from the Ninth,318 Second319 and
Seventh320 Circuits, that hold that Kokkonen strips courts of the authority to
expunge criminal records under equitable considerations. Then, this Section will
review the district court jurisprudence that has come out on the other side of this
issue.
The Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to hold that Kokkonen
precluded a district court from asserting ancillary jurisdiction to expunge
criminal records solely under equitable considerations.321 In United States v.
Sumner, the issue of whether a district court retained jurisdiction for
expungement was a case of first impression in the Ninth Circuit.322 The court
applied Kokkonen and concluded that the second prong “permits a district court
to order the expungement of criminal records in cases over which it once
exercised jurisdiction.”323 However, the court held that if the sole basis for the
expungement petition is equity, then a court’s assertion of jurisdiction over the

312

See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
The 5th, 10th, and D.C. Circuits have not addressed this issue.
314
See United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 51 n.6 (1st Cir. 2007); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192,
198 (2nd Cir. 2016); United States v. Rowlands 451 F.3d. 173, 177–78 (3rd. Cir. 2006); United States v. Mettetal,
714 Fed.Appx. 230, 234–35 (4th Cir. 2017); United States. v. Field, 756 F.3d. 911, 916 (6th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Meyer 439 F.3d 855, 861–62 (8th Cir.
2006); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Adalikwu, No. 18-12591,
2018 WL 6528446, at 2* (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2018).
315
See, e.g., United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 582 (D. Md. 2014); United States v Allen,
57 F. Supp. 3d 533, 541 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
316
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1346-47 (D. Utah 2008); United States v.
Brennan, No. 06–cr–00182–RBJ–1, 2015 WL 2208532, at 4* (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2015).
317
See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 282 F. Supp. 3d 275, 277 (D.D.C. 2017).
318
See Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014.
319
See Doe, 833 F.3d at 198.
320
See United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017).
321
See Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014.
322
Id.
323
Id.
313
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petition would not further either of the “goals” of the Kokkonen test.324 The court
reasoned that such a petition would not advance either of the “goals” because it
neither facilitated the resolution of interrelated claims nor helped the court
“vindicate its authority.”325 The court further clarified that for a district court to
have jurisdiction over such a claim, it must obtain jurisdiction via a
constitutional violation or a federal statute.326
The Second Circuit in Doe v. United States followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead.
When the Second Circuit decided Doe, several district courts in the Second
Circuit had been presented with, and refused to determine, the jurisdictional
issue that equitable expungement presents.327 These courts acknowledged that
under pre-Kokkonen Second Circuit jurisprudence,328 their jurisdiction over
equitable expungement petitions was unquestionable; however, in light of
Kokkonen, they were uncertain if those earlier decisions were still good law.329
In refusing to determine the jurisdictional issue, these courts uniformly denied
the expungement petitions they were presented with.330 The courts reasoned that
even if pre-Kokkonen precedent was still good law, the petitioners would not
satisfy the standards for equitable expungement.331
However, the district court in Doe v. United States reached a different
conclusion.332 The district court held that it did have jurisdiction, under the
second Kokkonen prong,333 to entertain the application to expunge the
applicant’s fraud conviction.334 The district court’s rationale was that “few
things could be more essential to ‘the conduct of federal-court business’ than the
appropriateness of expunging the public records that business creates.”335 The

324

Id.
Id.
326
Id.
327
See United States v. Burzynski, No. 10-MJ-1134, 2016 WL 1604491, at 2* (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2016)
(noting that the jurisdictional question was “unsettled” and denying the petition because “even if jurisdiction did
exist” it would not constitute an extreme circumstance); United States v. DeBerry, No. 05–MJ–62, 2013 WL
6816626, at 2* (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (same); United States v. Barlow, No. 01–CR–114–A, 2012 WL
125150, at 2* (W.D.N.Y Jan. 17, 2012) (same).
328
See supra notes 292–294 and accompanying text.
329
See Burzynski, 2016 WL 1604491, at *2; DeBerry, 2013 WL 6816626, at *2; Barlow, 2012 WL
125150, at *2.
330
See Burzynski, 2016 WL 1604491, at *3; DeBerry, 2013 WL 6816626, at *3; Barlow, 2012 WL
125150, at *3.
331
See Burzynski, 2016 WL 1604491, at *2; DeBerry, 2013 WL 6816626, at *2; Barlow, 2012 WL
125150, at *2.
332
Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, n.16 (E.D.N.Y 2015).
333
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
334
Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 454 n.16.
335
Id.
325
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government appealed, resulting in the Second Circuit’s first encounter with
expungement after Kokkonen.336
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.337 The court rejected the assertion
by the applicant and the district court that expunging “vindicate[d] its sentencing
decree” and therefore satisfied Kokkonen’s second prong.338 The Second Circuit
maintained the time period between the applicant’s motion and the serving of
her sentence339 was too great and therefore expunging the applicants record was
“unnecessary to . . . effectuate its decrees.”340 The applicant alternatively
claimed that her petition for expungement was “factually interdependent” with
her criminal proceedings and therefore qualified under the first prong.341 The
appellate court was unpersuaded and rejected the applicant’s argument because
“analytically” the original criminal proceedings and the motion for expungement
were too far apart in time.342 Although the Second Circuit denied the applicant’s
motion, the court suggested that legislative action could prevent “unfortunate”
outcomes such as this one.343 The court hinted that Congress “might consider”
passing another expungement statute.344
Similar to the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit had already developed a
strong body of case law supporting jurisdiction over the expunging of criminal
records solely under equitable considerations before Kokkonen was decided.345
This topic was revisited in United States v. Wahi, where the Seventh Circuit
overruled prior precedent and held that district courts could no longer exercise
its ancillary jurisdiction in the equitable expungement context.346
The Seventh Circuit held that its prior precedent could not be “reconciled”
with the Kokkonen decision because neither prong could be satisfied.347 In
addressing the interrelatedness prong, the court held that this type of
expungement petition will always rely on events and circumstances that arise

336

Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 200.
338
Id. at 198.
339
The applicants sentence ended seven years prior. Id. at 194.
340
Id. at 198 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994)).
341
Id. (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379 (1994)).
342
Id.
343
Id. at 199.
344
Id.
345
See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d
470 (7th Cir. 1993).
346
United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d. 296, 298 (7th Cir. 2017).
347
Id.
337
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after the case has ended and that this inquiry was “frankly, a policy choice.”348
Moreover, concerning whether equitable expungement aids a court in
“manag[ing] its proceedings” or “effectuat[ing] its decrees,” the court held that
the power to provide that remedy was neither necessary nor corollary for the
court to able to carry out its business.349 This remedy was not necessary for the
conduct of court business because “the criminal proceedings [were] over.”350 In
addition to finding that equitable expungement did not satisfy the Kokkonen test,
the court disconcertingly explained that the Seventh Circuit’s “status as an
outlier” amongst the circuit courts was a “compelling reason” to overturn prior
precedent.351
Notwithstanding the fact every federal appellate court that has directly
addressed the issue of expungement since Kokkonen has held that courts lack
ancillary jurisdiction, there have been several district court decisions, in addition
to the district court in Doe v. United States,352 that have found to the contrary.353
One of the leading decisions favoring a court’s jurisdiction to hear expungement
petitions arose in the context where the charges against the defendant had been
dismissed.354 In that case, the court ordered the expunction of the defendant’s
five-year-old arrest record for shoplifting.355 Although the court found that the
motion was not interrelated enough to warrant jurisdiction under the first
Kokkonen factor, the court analogized an expungement petition to a
“modification or revocation of supervised release” and found that it satisfied the
second factor because it helped the court “effectuate its decrees.”356
Intriguingly, multiple district courts within the Tenth Circuit, citing postKokkonen Tenth Circuit authority, have asserted jurisdiction over equitable
expungement motions and rejected the argument that Kokkonen precludes
jurisdiction.357 The decision these courts cite to is Camfield v. City of Oklahoma

348

Id. at 302.
Id. (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994)).
350
Id.
351
Id. at 303.
352
Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, n.16 (E.D.N.Y 2015).
353
See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577 (D. Md. 2014); United States v Allen, 57 F. Supp.
3d 533 (E.D.N.C. 2014).; United States v. Williams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (D. Utah 2008) United States v.
Douglas, 282 F. Supp. 3d 275 (D.D.C. 2017).
354
See McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 582.
355
Id. at 587.
356
Id. at 582.
357
See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, No. 06–cr–00182–RBJ–1, 2015 WL 2208532, at 5* (D. Colo. Apr.
27, 2015); United States v. Williams, No. 08–CR–0021–CVE, 2011 WL 489771, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 7,
2011). Both decisions cite to Camfield v. City of Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1234 (10th Cir. 2001), which was
decided seven years after Kokkonen.
349
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City,358 decided seven years after Kokkonen, where the Tenth Circuit stressed
that “[i]t is well settled in this circuit that courts have inherent equitable authority
to order the expungement of an arrest record or a conviction in rare or extreme
instances.”359 In further support of their position, the district courts maintain that
because Kokkonen does not address ancillary jurisdiction in criminal actions,
they are bound by prior precedent that asserts jurisdiction over these motions.360
However, Camfield does not address Kokkonen.361
V. THE CONSTRAINING MISINTERPRETATION OF KOKKONEN
The Supreme Court in Kokkonen stated that the “expansive language” it
employed in a prior ancillary jurisdiction decision was being construed too
broadly, and its holding in Kokkonen was intended to clarify the scope of the
doctrine.362 The test that Kokkonen articulated explained that ancillary
jurisdiction had traditionally been asserted “(1) to permit disposition by a single
court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually
interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to
manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.”363
This decision has led to an unwarranted and constricting interpretation of the
ancillary jurisdiction doctrine in the expungement context. This Comment
argues that the holding and language of Kokkonen coupled with traditional
assertions of ancillary jurisdiction and the case law cited after the enumeration
of the prongs do not warrant such a constraining interpretation.
Further, this Comment concedes that expunging of criminal records under
solely equitable considerations may not fall fully in either of the prongs as
separate entities. However, this Comment argues that equitable expungement
falls in between the two prongs. This Kokkonen (1.5) area between the two
prongs consists of a melding of the “sometimes related purposes” language in
Kokkonen as it links the two prongs364 and the philosophy behind supplemental
jurisdiction.365

358

248 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1234.
360
See Williams, 2011 WL 489771, at 3* n.2; Brennan, 2015 WL 2208532, at *5.
361
See Camfield, 248 F.3d at 1234–35 (discussing the expungement issue without mentioning Kokkonen).
362
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1994) (citing Julian v. Cent. Tr. Co.,
193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904)).
363
Id. at 379–80 (citations omitted).
364
Id.
365
See supra notes 144–147.
359
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A. The Misinterpretation
In the paragraph before the Supreme Court enumerated the Kokkonen
prongs, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction can
hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise . . . .”366 This was in
response to the argument that, based on the language in the Supreme Court’s
holding in Julian v. Central Trust Co., a federal court could exercise its ancillary
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement that was not incorporated into the
order dismissing the suit.367
The language from Julian relied upon in support of this argument was “[a]
bill filed to continue a former litigation . . . to obtain and secure the fruits,
benefits and advantages of the proceedings . . . or to obtain any equitable relief
in regard to, or connected with, or growing out of, any judgment or proceeding
. . . is an ancillary suit.”368 Unquestionably, under this language a district court
would have, and in fact did have,369 ancillary jurisdiction over a motion to
expunge criminal records for solely equitable considerations. However, in
Kokkonen, the Supreme Court back-tracked on that language and concluded that
“the holding of Julian was not remotely as permissive as its language . . . .”370
Similarly, the holding of Kokkonen is not as restrictive as it is being
interpreted. The holding was that a federal court did not have ancillary
jurisdiction over a settlement agreement, which is a separate contract, that was
not incorporated into the order dismissing the suit.371 In other words, the Court
held that a federal court cannot assert jurisdiction over a breach of contract
claim, which is governed by state law, unless it has its own basis for subject
matter jurisdiction.372 This holding, coupled with the language preceding the
Kokkonen prongs and the case law that is cited after each prong, demonstrate
that the circuit courts have been construing Kokkonen far too narrowly regarding
a court’s jurisdiction over expungement petitions.
The language that precedes the two Kokkonen prongs is notably amorphous.
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that the scope of the ancillary
jurisdiction doctrine was ill-defined,373 and then directly before enumerating the

366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.
Id. at 378–79.
Id. at 379 (citing Julian v. Cent. Tr. Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113–14 (1904)).
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.
Id. at 380–81.
See supra note 199.
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
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test added a qualifier: “[g]enerally speaking, we have asserted ancillary
jurisdiction . . . for two separate, though sometimes related, purposes . . . .”374
By mentioning that the scope of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine was illdefined and then prefacing the prongs with a qualifier, the Court was not
intending to have the two prongs be a strict standard for a court’s ability to assert
ancillary jurisdiction.375 Instead, the court was likely attempting to avoid
defining the parameters of the doctrine, as the Court referred to it, that could
“hardly be criticized for being overly rigid or precise.”376 Moreover, it is highly
doubtful that the Supreme Court, in deciding Kokkonen and setting out the
prongs, was attempting to overrule circuit court decisions in nearly every circuit
that held that district courts had ancillary jurisdiction to expunge criminal
records solely under equitable considerations.377
Further supporting the idea that equitable expungement falls within the
Supreme Court’s holding in Kokkonen are historical exercises of ancillary
jurisdiction378 and the case law cited to after each of the prongs.379 Regarding
historical exercises of ancillary jurisdiction, drawing parallels between a court’s
ability to exercise ancillary jurisdiction to resolve attorney’s fees disputes is
particularly illustrative. Unlike equitable petitions for the expunging of criminal
records, attorney’s fees disputes have nothing to do with substance of the action
invoking the court’s jurisdiction.380 Moreover, similar to how the balancing test
for equitable expungement petitions may depend on events that transpire after
the decision has been rendered,381 an attorney’s fees dispute may require an
inquiry into actions that occurred outside of the court room and potentially after
the suit had concluded. However, courts routinely exercise jurisdiction over
these issues.382 It can hardly be argued that in this manner, under the test
Kokkonen articulates and particularly in light of the “sometimes related
purposes” language, a federal court would be able to assert ancillary jurisdiction
to resolve an attorney’s fee dispute, but not an equitable expungement
petition.383

374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.
See id.
See id.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156–182 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212–276 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text.
Supra note 353 and accompanying text.
Supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994).
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In addition to the traditional exercises of ancillary jurisdiction, the cases
cited after each of the Kokkonen prongs weigh in favor of a broad interpretation
of the Kokkonen holding. For example, the cases that are cited after the first
prong, both of which involve counterclaims,384 are related to FED. R. CIV. P. 13,
which encompasses counterclaims.385 However, the Court did not address Rule
13 in enumerating this prong nor at any point in its decision.386 This lack of
reference to Rule 13, coupled with the broad scope of permissive counterclaims
pursuant to Rule 13(b),387 militates towards the interpretation that the first prong
casts a wide net over related claims and proceedings. Additionally, the case law
that the Court employed to support its assertion that a federal court retains
ancillary jurisdiction to “effectuate” its orders and “manage its proceedings”
further gives credence to a broader interpretation of the prongs.388 These cases
involve situations in which a court’s ability to function and carry out its
proceedings properly is impeded.389 They hold that once a court’s ability to
function is obstructed, the court has the inherent authority to alleviate the issue
in a manner that allows the court to function properly.390 In the equitable
expungement context, the assertion that a court’s exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction does not tend to support a court’s ability to carry out its functions,
by ensuring that its decrees are not given more effect than intended,391 is shaky
at best. The assertion is shaky because the stigma attached to a criminal record
reasonably can be, and should be, viewed as an “invisible punishment.”392
With that being said, the language of Kokkonen further supports the grounds
for district courts to assert ancillary jurisdiction over equitable expungement
motions.393 Admittedly, if the prongs were to be taken distinctly as two separate
avenues for jurisdiction, as interpreted by the circuits that now hold they lack
jurisdiction over these motions,394 the argument for ancillary jurisdiction
becomes more tenuous. However, the Court in Kokkonen stated that, on

384

Supra notes 215–243 and accompanying text.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
386
See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
387
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
388
Supra notes 244–277 and accompanying text.
389
Supra notes 244–277 and accompanying text.
390
Supra notes 244–277 and accompanying text.
391
See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 582 (D. Md. 2014); United States v. Allen, 57 F.
Supp. 3d 533, 541 (E.D.N.C. 2014); Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
392
See Carey, supra note 38, at 546.
393
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1994).
394
See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 2016) (addressing each prong separately);
United States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 302–03 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005,
1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).
385

SALKY_8.28.20

2020]

8/28/2020 1:28 PM

ANCILLARY ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION

1301

occasion, the prongs are grounds for ancillary jurisdiction for “sometimes
related purposes,”395 and that is squarely where equitable expungement falls.
B. The Area in Between the Prongs: Kokkonen (1.5)
Although expungement under solely equitable considerations may not fall
precisely in either of the two prongs distinctly, when Kokkonen is considered in
light of the “sometimes related purposes” language396 and the philosophy behind
supplemental jurisdiction,397 the notion that it falls between the two prongs
becomes clear.
The traditional balancing test for the expungement of criminal records is one
of the strongest indicators that equitable expungement falls into the “sometimes
related purposes” language of Kokkonen.398 Historically, the balancing test for
the expungement of criminal records weighs the petitioner’s interest in having
their records expunged against the public’s interest in having the records widely
available.399 Here is where the “sometimes related purposes” of the two prongs
arises.400
The first prong of the Kokkonen analysis allows the exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction to “permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying
respects and degrees, factually interdependent . . . .”401 Concededly, a
considerable portion of the balancing test will require examining facts that
occurred after the conclusion of the case, such as a lack of housing and
employment opportunities.402 However, nowhere in the Kokkonen test does the
Court place a temporal restriction on the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction.403
Additionally, the balancing test also necessarily requires an inquiry into the facts
of the original case.404 These facts include what the crime was, whether the
petitioner was found guilty, whether this was the petitioner’s first offense, and
whether there was sufficient evidence presented for a jury to convict.405 The
395

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.
Id.
397
Supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
398
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.
399
E.g., United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977).
400
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
401
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
402
E.g., United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 584–85 (D. Md. 2014).
403
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
404
Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454 n.16 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
405
See United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1990) (explaining that because the defendant’s
arrest records and indictment “represent valuable law enforcement records,” balancing of the interests weighed
in favor of denying expungement); United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 1988) (examining
396
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utilization of these facts further have the potential to play a factor in determining
whether a court’s order is effectuated properly and has not resulted in overpunishment. Moreover, a substantial part of weighing the public’s interest in
having the records available is what the public is being protected from.406 This
additionally will hinge on the facts of the prior case.407
Similar to the inquiry under the first prong, the assertion of jurisdiction for
equitable expungement may not fall precisely within the language of the second
prong.408 The second prong stipulates that ancillary jurisdiction may be asserted
“to enable the court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings,
vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees . . . .”409 The court and the
public as a whole have an interest in the court’s ability to ensure that its decrees
are effectuated appropriately and its sentencing has not resulted in overpenalizing.410 The stigma attached to a criminal record and the consequences
that flow from it411 can be in in direct conflict with the interests of a court and
the public in this regard. Moreover, this stigma can be analogized to a supervised
release412 or an “invisible punishment”413 not intended to be levied by the court.
In this framework, it logically follows that expunging a criminal record under
solely equitable considerations would aid a court in “effectuat[ing] its decrees”
and “vindicat[ing] its authority.”414
When this inquiry is taken in tandem with, or for the “related purposes” of,415
the inquiry under the first prong, the concept that equitable expungement falls
within the language of Kokkonen between the two prongs is solidified. The
concept of a Kokkonen (1.5) area in between the two prongs is supported by a

whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the petitioner); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th
Cir. 1975) (recognizing the relevance of the validity of the arrest); Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d. 427,
440 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that the defendant’s “criminal case and her expungement motion” satisfied the
first prong); United States v. Brennan, No. 06–cr–00182–RBJ–1, 2015 WL 2208532, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 27,
2015) (“jurisdiction is inextricably linked to the unique facts of this case”).
406
See Criminal Procedure—Ancillary Jurisdiction—District Court Grants Motion to Expunge
Conviction for Equitable Reasons.—Doe v. United States, No. 14-MC-1412, 2015 WL 2452613 (E.D.N.Y. May
21, 2015), 129 HARV. L. REV. 582, 588 (2015).
407
Id.
408
See, e.g., supra note 319.
409
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994).
410
See Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (“I have an interest in ensuring that the sentence is ‘effectuated’
properly.”).
411
Supra notes 24–52 and accompanying text.
412
See United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 582 (D. Md. 2014).
413
See Carey, supra note 38 at 546.
414
See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
415
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379.
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merging of the philosophy embedded in the supplemental jurisdiction statute416
and the exercise of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction that survived the passage
of the statute.417 Although the Supreme Court did not reference supplemental
jurisdiction in Kokkonen418 and therefore was likely not intending to comment
on supplemental jurisdiction, when the language of the first prong is mirrored
against the language of the supplemental jurisdiction statute it is apparent that,
at the least, the philosophy behind the statute is doing some work. The first
Kokkonen prong states that ancillary jurisdiction has commonly been exercised
“to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects
and degrees, factually interdependent . . . .”419 In comparison, the supplemental
jurisdiction statue, with some exceptions, permits a court to exercise jurisdiction
“over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III . . . .”420
The similarities in these grants of jurisdiction are striking and thus the
philosophy behind the supplemental jurisdiction statue does appear to be of
consequence. This philosophy is that, although a claim may not invoke a court’s
original jurisdiction, it is more efficient and convenient for the parties to have
the related claim resolved in one forum.421 Superimposing this philosophy onto
the “related purposes” of the two Kokkonen prongs it is apparent how
“permit[ing] disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects
and degrees, factually interdependent . . . to enable a court to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and
effectuate its decrees,”422 promotes efficiency and convenience. Thus
empowering a court to assert ancillary jurisdiction over equitable expungement
petitions that have some factual interdependence to the original action and
further a court’s interest in not having its decrees results in unintended
punishment.
This interpretation of Kokkonen will restore the district courts’ ability to
exercise ancillary enforcement jurisdiction to entertain expungement petitions
under solely equitable considerations. District courts will not have to look far for

416

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012).
Supra note 146–151 and accompanying text.
418
See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
419
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80 (emphasis added).
420
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (emphasis added).
421
See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, RICHARD D. FREER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 (3d ed. 2008).
422
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80 (citations omitted).
417
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the appropriate balancing test to resolve expungement petitions because there
are circuit court decisions in nearly every circuit that perform the balancing
test.423 The implications of this jurisdiction will not result in a mass granting of
expungement petitions. Expungement is still warranted only in the “exceptional
circumstances” where the private interests outweigh the public interests in
expungement.424 Hopefully, however, this will allow for individuals, whose
record has acted as a moratorium on their ability to function in society, to be
able to live their lives without having to be encumbered by a criminal record.
CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that all but three of the circuit courts have
misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America by holding that it precludes district courts from
asserting ancillary jurisdiction over motions to expunge criminal records solely
under equitable considerations. The Supreme Court in Kokkonen was attempting
to clarify a prior ancillary jurisdiction holding that, in its view, was being read
too expansively. Coincidentally, Kokkonen led to the circuit courts’ interpreting
ancillary jurisdiction too narrowly regarding its jurisdiction over equitable
expungement petitions.
This narrow reading of Kokkonen has removed a tool that district courts had
traditionally used to alleviate some of the issues, through expungement, that
criminal records present. Although expungement is a limited remedy, only to be
granted in extraordinary circumstances, it has the potential to help some
individuals where their interests and fundamental fairness outweigh the public’s
interest in maintaining the records. Thus, this detaches individuals from the
cycle of lack of employment and housing opportunities and ultimate recidivism.
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